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When a government announces that an existing law will be amended, and
that the amendment, when finally enacted by the legislature, will be made
effective from the announcement date, it is natural and inevitable that
private entities will conduct their activities on the basis of the amended
law immediately upon the announcement date, notwithstanding the
announcement’s lack of any formal legal effect. This practice of effecting
immediate de facto legal changes is known derisively, but perhaps aptly,
as “legislation by press release.” This Article utilizes the recent use of
legislation by press release to implement the Buyer’s Stamp Duty in Hong
Kong as a case study to critically examine the legality and normative
considerations of this increasingly common but under-theorized practice.
Legally, this Article argues that the prospective notice provided by the
initial announcement ensures the practice’s legality in all but an explicit
prohibition of retrospective civil legislation. Normatively, this Article
highlights the various criteria of clarity, consistency, necessity and
political dynamic that affect the desirability of the practice. On a broader
note, the formal retrospectivity inherent in the practice - but which does
not disrupt the reliance interests of private entities - provides a useful
reexamination of the conventional aversion towards retrospective laws.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Retrospective laws have never failed to capture the attention
of legal scholars.1 From the early writings of eminent jurists such as
Blackstone and Hobbes2 to modern journals and books devoted to
the subject,3 the notion of laws that catch individuals off-guard by
subsequently changing the legal consequences of past actions has
always had the capacity to excite discussions thereof. This copious
literature has delved into the various aspects of the concept, such as
the tension between the hostility towards statutory retrospectivity
versus the more tacit acquiescence of adjudicative retrospectivity,4
the relationship between retrospectivity and the rule of law,5 the
distinction between the common law presumption against
retrospectivity and the presumption against interference with vested

1

For a discussion about the various – and at times confusing – definitions of retrospective
laws and the related concept of retroactive laws, see infra II.A.
2
For a concise discussion about the historical origin on retrospectively, including the early
scholarly works, see BEN JURATOWITCH, RETROACTIVITY AND THE COMMON LAW 27-35
(2008); CHARLES SAMPFORD, RETROSPECTIVITY AND THE RULE OF LAW 9-17 (2006). For
examples of early treatise devoted to retrospective law, see WILLIAM G. MYER, VESTED
RIGHTS: SELECTED CASES AND NOTES ON RETROSPECTIVE AND ARBITRARY LEGISLATION
AFFECTING VESTED RIGHTS OF PROPERTY (1891); WILLIAM PRATT WADE, A TREATISE ON
THE OPERATION AND CONSTRUCTION OF RETROACTIVE LAWS: AS AFFECTED BY
CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS AND JUDICIAL INTERPRETATIONS (1880).
3
E.g., CHARLES SAMPFORD, supra note 2; JURATOWITCH, supra note 2; Ulf Bernitz,
Retroactive Legislation in a European Perspective – On the Importance of General
Principles of Law, 2000 INT’L ASPECTS 43 (2000); Jill E. Fisch, Retroactivity and Legal
Change: An Equilibrium Approach, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1055 (1997); Andrew Palmer &
Charles Sampford, Retrospective Legislation in Australia: Looking Back at the 1980s, 22
FED. L. REV. 217 (1993); John Prebble et al.,, Legislation with Retrospective Effect, with
Particular Reference to Tax Loopholes and Avoidance, 22 N.Z.U.L. REV. 17 (2006); J.
Paul Salembier, Understanding Retroactivity: When the Past Just Ain’t What it Used to be,
33 H. K. L. J. 99 (2003).
4
See e.g., JURATOWITCH, supra note 2, at 67-109 & 220-2 (detailed analysis of court’s
divergence approach towards the two types of retrospectivity, and argued that a more
uniform and principled approach is desirable); Fisch, supra note 3 (arguing against the
disparate treatment towards the two types of retrospectivity and for a uniformed approach
where retrospective laws is permissible if the regulatory context is in flux).
5
See e.g., MARTIN P. GOLDING, LEGAL REASONING, LEGAL THEORY AND RIGHTS 239-62
(2007) (examining the implication on rule of law arising from the retrospective criminal
sanctioning of individuals who committed morally reprehensible acts that are formally
legal in a prior totalitarian regime); SAMPFORD, supra note 2, at 257-88 (contextual
discussion of the various types of retrospective laws and argues that there will be
circumstances where retrospective laws are both normative desirable and consistent with
the rule of law properly understood).
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rights, 6 and the compatibility of retrospective laws with general
constitutional and/or human rights requirements of “in accordance
with law” or similarly worded provisions.7
There is a particular type of retrospective law that has
received relatively scant attention. Known derisively as “legislation
by press release,” this practice involves the government announcing
that an existing law will be amended and that the amendment, when
finally enacted by the legislature, will be made effective from the
announcement date. 8 The coining of “legislation” is rather apt
because, notwithstanding the announcement’s lack of any formal
legal effect, it is natural and inevitable that private entities will
conduct their activities on the basis of the amended law immediately
upon the announcement date. Yet, despite the increasing usage in
various jurisdictions9 of this potent tool of the executive branch to
exercise immediate de facto legal influence on the behavior of
private entities without any legislative authorization, the
considerations that are applicable in assessing the normative
desirability of legislation by press release has remained largely

6

See e.g., Salembier, supra note 3, at 116-8, 137-8 (arguing for a clear conceptual
distinction between the two presumptions since, notwithstanding the close relationship
between the two, each deals with specific and distinct harm).
7
See e.g., Melvin R.T. Pauwels, Retroactive Tax Legislation in View of Article 1 First
Protocol ECHR, 2013/6 EC TAX REVIEW 268 (2013) (discussing how European Court of
Human Rights assess the permissibility of retroactive taxes in light of Article 1 of the First
Protocol that provides “No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public
interest and subject to the conditions provided by law and by the general principles of
international law.” (emphasis added)). See also Daniel Deák, Pioneering Decision of the
Constitutional Court of Hungary to Invoke the Protection of Human Dignity in Tax Matters,
39 INTERTAX 534 (2011) (discussing the Hungarian Constitutional Court use of the
“protection of human dignity” to invalidate the retrospectivity of certain confiscatory tax);
Bernitz, supra note 3, at 51-5 (discussing the requirement of “legal certainty” and
retrospective law). See infra IV.B.2.
8
SAMPFORD, supra note 2, at 156-7; Terry Hayes & Kirk Wilson, Proposed Amendments to
Australia’s Anti-Avoidance Laws Cause Business Uncertainty, 23 J. OF INT’L TAXATION 52,
52 (2012); Joseph Jaconelli, Tax Legislation, Forestalling, and Economic Information,
2013 PUBLIC LAW 737, 745 (2013); Robert Påhlsson, Retroactivity: Swedish Practice on
Legislation by Governmental Communication, 39 INTERTAX 271, 271-2 (2011); Miranda
Stewart & Kristen Walker, Australia: National Report, 15 MICH. ST. J. INT’L L. 193, 239
(2007); Palmer & Sampford, supra note 3, at 235.
9
In Australia, the use has become prevalent since the late 1970s. Stewart & Walker, supra
note 8, at 239; SAMPFORD, supra note 2, at 156. In Canada, see Salembier, supra note 3, at
107. In the U.K., see Infobank, Taxation: Legislation by Press Release, 1992(7) BUS. L. R.
(U.K.) 176, 176-7 (1992). In Sweden, see Påhlsson, supra note 8, at 274.
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unexamined.10 In what circumstances, if any at all, can the use of
legislation by press release be desirable?
Legislation by press release also poses interesting conceptual
challenges to the conventional understanding of retrospective laws.
The retrospectivity of the new law is unquestioned given the explicit
backdating of legal effect, yet the typical objections to retrospective
laws that are based on the protection of reliance interests of
individuals11 are not applicable if the government announcement is
accompanied by a sufficiently clear and detailed description of the
new law. In this regard, does “retrospectivity” still warrant a
categorical “heightened scrutiny” in legal doctrines such as the
presumption against retrospectivity 12 and the outright ban of
retrospective laws,13 or should the inquiry be reoriented towards the
underlying harms that are commonly associated with but not
inevitable or exclusive to retrospective laws?
The recent implementation of the Buyer’s Stamp Duty
(BSD) in Hong Kong provides an illustrative case study to examine
these pertinent issues. On October 27, 2012, the Financial Secretary
(akin to the Finance Minister) made a sudden announcement that a
new transaction tax of 15% of a property’s value would be imposed
on all residential property purchasers who are not permanent

10

The most detailed treatment of legislation by press release is by Charles Sampford, see
SAMPFORD, supra note 2, at 156-162; Palmer & Sampford, supra note 3, at 262-70. For
other mentions/discussions, see infra II.C.
11
JURATOWITCH, supra note 2, at 44-64; SAMPFORD, supra note 2, at 77; Fisch, supra note
3, at 1084-5; Prebble, et al., supra note 3, at 19; Salembier, supra note 3, at 106-7. See
infra II.B.
12
JURATOWITCH, supra note 2, at 67-118; Salembier, supra note 3, at 112-6. See VICTOR E.
SCHWARTZ & EVELYN F. ROWE, COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE 188-92 (LexisNexis 5th ed.
2010) (discussing U.S. courts’ approach in the specific context of statutory retroactivity in
comparative negligence rules).
13
E.g., Hungary: Deák, supra note 7, at 540-1; Sweden: Påhlsson, supra note 8, at 272;
Bernitz, supra note 3, at 43-7 (finding the constitutional prohibition of retroactive tax and
fee was added in 1979 to complement the existing prohibition on retroactive criminal law);
Oman: Jaconelli, supra note 8, at 744.
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residents of Hong Kong. 14 This new tax is a property-cooling
measure intended to curb the rapid rise in property prices that has
occurred over the past couple of years. 15 The BSD would be
applicable to all property transactions taking place on or after
October 28, 2012, one day subsequent to the announcement.
Notwithstanding the fact that the draft bill giving effect to this new
tax would only be ready a few months after the announcement16 and
that the draft bill would continue to languish in the legislature for
sixteen months before its eventual enactment,17 the effects of this
yet-to-be-enacted law have been keenly felt by all relevant parties
since the purported effective date of October 28, 2012. Demand
from foreigners—the target of the new tax—dropped
precipitously.18 Land developers made more conservative bids for
new land. 19 Lawyers handling property transactions collected
several billion Hong Kong dollars (HKD) in pending BSDs.20 Most
significantly, the purported legislative objective of cooling the
property market was at least partially achieved, with secondary
14

Tom Holland, Excluding Mainlanders Won’t Allay Main Property Grievance, S. CHINA
MORNING POST, Oct. 29, 2012, at 8. There is no “Hong Kong citizen” in Hong Kong –
“Permanent Resident” is the highest level of immigration/residency status that can be
obtained and which enjoyed the most rights and privileges in Hong Kong. For a concise
exposition on the various aspects of “citizenship” in Hong Kong, including historical
evolution, manners of acquisition and legal implications, see Johannes Chan, Nationality
and Permanent Residence, in LAW OF THE HONG KONG CONSTITUTION 143 (Johannes Chan
& C.L. Lim eds., 2011).
15
Joyce Ng, et. al., Buyers Rush to Beat Surprise Homes Tax, S. CHINA MORNING POST,
Oct. 27, 2012, at 1. For a discussion of the property market in Hong Kong, see infra III.A.
16
Joyce Ng & Sandy Li, C.Y. Snubs City Companies’ Pleas for Tax Exemption, S. CHINA
MORNING POST, Dec. 19, 2012, at 1; Joyce Ng, Stamp Duty’s Loophole will not be Closed
by Bill, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Nov. 3, 2012, at 3.
17
Stamp Duty (Amendment) Ordinance 2014, 18(9) GAZETTE (H.K.), Feb. 28, 2014; Liang
Yongsi, “Shuangla” shihu le! [“Double Cooling Measures” Finally Passed], SINGTAO
DAILY, Feb. 23, 2014, at A1.
18
Sandy Li, SHKP Trims Luxuries at Top End of Town, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Dec. 28,
2012, at 3; Paggie Leung, Home Tax Puts Chill in Mainland Buyers, S. CHINA MORNING
POST, Nov. 2, 2012, at 1; Peggy Sito, New Buyer’s Hopes Rise with Tax, S. CHINA
MORNING POST, Oct. 31, 2012, at 1.
19
Yvonne Liu, Big Two Developers Cool Their Heels, S. CHINA MORNING POST, July 10,
2013, at 1; Sandy Li, Developer Caution Hangs Over Land Sale Prospects, S. CHINA
MORNING POST, Jan. 2, 2013, at 4.
20
Caiye gaoji: foujue lazhao lougu zheng [Financial Secretary Warning: Vetoing Cooling
Measures Would Result in Tumor in Property and Stock Market], SINGTAO DAILY, Feb. 22,
2014, at A4; Lazhao zaoan zhao labu shuyi suikuan jiya [Filibuster of Property Cooling
Measures Causes Backlog of Several Hundred Millions of Tax], ORIENTAL DAILY NEWS,
Nov. 27, 2013. The exchange rate of HKD is pegged to the US Dollar at a rate of about
7.8:1: Y. Y. Kueh & Raymond C. W. Ng, The Interplay of the “China Factor” and US
Dollar Peg in the Hong Kong Economy, 170 CHINA QUARTERLY 387 (2002).
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home prices witnessing a modest fall, a reversal of the substantial
increase over the previous two years.21
This Article critically examines this episode of legislation by
press release to make three main arguments. The first is a relatively
narrow but previously unexplored legal issue—namely, that
regardless of the normative desirability of legislation by press
release, the practice is legal in Hong Kong. The constitutional
prohibition of retrospective laws22 is limited to criminal sanctions
and is not applicable to a property-transaction tax that is not
punitive in nature. More significantly, although the jurisprudence of
the European Court of Human Rights has indicated that
retrospective non-criminal laws may be potentially at risk of
violating the expanded notion of “law” in the “prescribed by law”
requirement typically stipulated in human rights documents for
imposition of legal burdens,23 the detailed specifics of the proposed
law set out in the initial announcement under a typical legislation by
press release would have effectively shielded it from this legal
challenge.
The second argument draws on the insight arising from this
first-ever detailed contextual examination of actual legislation by
press release to articulate the considerations that affect the
normative desirability of the practice. Beyond the relatively
obvious requirement that the initial announcement must be
sufficiently clear and consistent with respect to the new legal rules,
there must also be sufficient justifications for what is essentially a
short-circuiting of the legislative process. Reflecting the mixed
assessment of whether the use of legislation by press release to
implement the BSD is actually necessary to achieve the policy goal
of property cooling, 24 the necessary inquiry would first entail
identifying the purported legislative objectives, before being
21

Sandy Li, Curbs Likely to Stay Until Prices Fall, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Aug. 21,
2013, at 1; Peggy Sito & Joyce Ng, Secondary Home Prices Continues Fall on Duties, S.
CHINA MORNING POST, Dec. 8, 2012, at 2.
22
Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance, (1997) Cap. 383, § 12 (H.K). See infra IV.B.
23
For a discussion of the European Court of Human Rights jurisprudence on this issue, see
Pauwels, supra note 7, at 272; Påhlsson, supra note 8, at 273. For the argument in the
context of Hong Kong, see Sir Anthony Mason, The Place of Comparative Law in
Developing the Jurisprudence on the Rule of Law and Human Rights in Hong Kong, 37
H.K. L. J. 299, 314-5 (2007). See infra IV.B.2.
24
Infra IV.B.2.
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followed up by an examination of the incentives created for private
entities by the policy announcement to predict and assess whether a
forward shift of the activities targeted by the legal change would
derail the legislative objectives.
In addition, given that the main critique of legislation by
press release is the violation of separation of powers, with the
executive essentially engaging in a de facto form of law-making,25
the desirability of legislation by press release is intrinsically linked
to the underlying political dynamic. The political dynamic of a
jurisdiction is the product of the interplay between the formal
constitutional structure and political competition on the ground.26
Legislation by press release is most undesirable where a formal
separation of powers between the executive and legislature is
combined with an agnostic and divided political landscape.
Conversely, the various criticisms against legislation by press
release 27 are largely moot under a Westminster system that
envisages a close relationship between the executive and the
legislature, when both are dominated by a single political party.
The final argument challenges the conventional aversion
towards formally retrospective laws and highlights the irrelevancy
of a law’s formal retrospectivity to the disruption caused to the
reliance interests of private individuals. This argument echoes the
insight provided by the well-established U.S. legal literature on
“legal transition,”28 but with an additional contribution observing
how the assumption of stable legal regime that underpins the
general objections toward retrospective laws is particularly ill-suited
25

SAMPFORD, supra note 2, at 160-1; Palmer & Sampford, supra note 3, at 264-5.
Infra V.C.1. See generally Daryl J. Levinson & Richard H. Pildes, Separation of Parties,
Not Powers, 119 HARV. L. REV. 2311 (2006) (critically discussing how competition
between political parties can vary and even at times overshadow the institutional
competition between the different branches of government); Anthony Kammer, Privatizing
the Safeguards of Federalism, 29 J.L. & POL. 69 (2013) (examining how political
coordination between influential private entities can transcend the formal jurisdictional
boundaries of federalism). Cf. Tara Leigh Grove, The Article II Safeguards of Federal
Jurisdiction, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 250, 312-4 (2012) (arguing that for the judicial branch at
least, formal inter-branch separation of power remains salient even in the context where the
executive and legislature are of the same political affiliation).
27
These primarily include uncertainty, especially from the delay in legislative ratification,
and violation to the separation of powers, see infra II.C.
28
Louis Kaplow, An Economic Analysis of Legal Transitions, 99 HARV. L. REV. 509, 513-5
(1986); Michael J. Graetz, Legal Transitions: the Case of Retroactivity in Income Tax
Revision, 126 U. PENN. L. REV. 47, 47-8 (1977). See infra VI.
26
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for jurisdictions undergoing major political and democratic
transitions. In these jurisdictions—which are more the norm than
the exception around the globe today—stability in the maintenance
of the prior regime is neither expected nor desired.
This Article is organized into seven Parts. Part II explores
the existing literature to present the theoretical framework
governing retrospective laws and legislation by press release. Part
III examines the implementation of the BSD in Hong Kong—in
particular, the twists and turns in the protracted legislative process
and the real effect of the announcement in shaping the behaviors of
the relevant parties. Part IV addresses the legality of legislation by
press release with respect to the legal doctrines of retrospectivity,
“in accordance with law” and taxing powers. Part V analyzes the
factors relevant to assessing whether the employment of legislation
by press release is normatively justified. Part VI discusses the
broader implications on the understanding of retrospective laws.
Part VII concludes.

II. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK: RETROSPECTIVE LAWS
LEGISLATION BY PRESS RELEASE

AND

This Part initiates the discussion by first addressing
definitional issues surrounding retrospective laws before reviewing
the existing literature on the normative considerations surrounding
retrospective laws in general and legislation by press release in
particular.

A. Retrospectivity and Retroactivity
A discussion of retrospective laws naturally should begin
with the definition of “retrospective,” especially in comparison with
the similar and related concept of “retroactivity.” Despite numerous
attempts to provide a conclusive working definition, both terms
have been used to denote different meanings by different scholars.29
29

For a general discussion about the confusing and conflicting use of the term, see
JURATOWITCH, supra note 2, at 6-17; Salembier, supra note 3, at 104-7. See also
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The fact that the two terms are commonly cross-referenced in the
dictionary30 only serves to aggravate the confusion, especially in
non-legal discourse (i.e., political and public debate). The general
consensus reflected in modern literature is that “retroactive law” is a
narrower—and, often, normatively more problematic—conceptual
subset of “retrospective law,”31 although some scholars have begun
to advocate abolishing the formal distinction between the two.32
Beyond this broad consensus, the precise content of the
definition remains unsettled. For example, Ben Juratowitch’s 2008
book on “retroactivity” and English common law proposed
restricting “retroactive” laws to mean only laws that “apply to a past
event as though it was applicable at the time of the event”,33 such as
“[a] law entering into force on Wednesday making it an offence to
have parked on High Street from the preceding Monday onwards.”34
This usage is to be contrasted with the broader concept of
“retrospective” laws, which include not only “retroactive” laws but
also laws that have inter-temporal effects, such as how a law
prospectively banning parking might affect a long-term parking
permit.35 By contrast, Charles Sampford, in his book on the broader
concept of “retrospectivity,” defined “retrospective” laws “as laws
which alter the future legal consequences of past actions and events
because the legal texts that will be applied to determine the legal
consequences of an action at a hearing in the future are not same as
the texts that were discoverable at the time the action
commenced.” 36 This definition appears similar to Juratwotich’s
definition of “retroactivity,”37 even if Sampford appeared to agree
SAMPFORD, supra note 2, at 9-17 (providing a historical perspective on the development of
the concept of retrospectivity).
30
Salembier, supra note 3, at 105.
31
E.g., Pauwels, supra note 7, at 270-2; Hans Gribnau, Equality, Legal Certainty and Tax
Legislation in the Netherlands, 9(2) UTRECHT L. REV. 52, 71 (2013); Påhlsson, supra note
8, at 272; JURATOWITCH, supra note 2, at 9-12, 17; SAMPFORD, supra note 2, at 17;
Salembier, supra note 3, at 102-6.
32
E.g., SAMPFORD, supra note 2, at 17-23; Prebble et al.,, supra note 3, at 24-9. The
tendency to dispense the distinction most pronounce in the predominantly U.S. legal
literature on “legal transition.” See infra VI.
33
JURATOWITCH, supra note 2, at 17.
34
Id. at 5.
35
Id. at 9-12.
36
SAMPFORD, supra note 2, at 37.
37
Ben Juratowitch considered, and disagreed with, Sampford’s position in the debate as
simply that the distinction between retrospective and retroactive is immaterial since the
effect of both is the same. JURATOWITCH, supra note 2, at 11-2.
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that “retroactive” should “refer to retrospective laws whose
retrospective effect is formally and explicitly stated by indicating
that an enactment is to take effect before its promulgation.”38 The
journal article by John Prebble, Rebecca Prebble and Catherine
Vidler Smith similarly presented an illustrative example of the
difficulty in defining the concept of “retrospectivity.” In their article,
they began by explicitly adopting the definition that “[r]etropsective
legislation can be seen as altering the direct legal consequences of
past events or statuses,”39 then distinguished this definition by also
stating that “[r]etrospective legislation can be seen as altering the
future legal consequences of past events” (i.e., the difference
between “direct” and “future”),40 and finally emphasized that the
definition used in their article “addresses both legislation that is
clearly retrospective in that in applies to dates before its
commencement and legislation that is not explicitly retrospective
but that affects pre-existing rights and expectations.”41
Part of the reason for the confusion is due to the different
context in which the definition and/or distinction is formulated. In
jurisdictions where “retroactive” laws—but not “retrospective”
laws—are constitutionally prohibited, the definition of “retroactive”
must be given a clearly defined and narrow meaning to mitigate the
dire legal significance that flows from it.42 Unsurprisingly, the
distinction is less material in jurisdictions where there is no outright
prohibition against “retroactive” laws, such as under EU law, for
which the European Court of Human Rights has employed both
terms interchangeably. 43 In English common law jurisdictions,
where the issue of the “presumption against retrospectivity” in
statutory interpretation is at stake, the inquiry inevitably focuses on
“retrospectivity” to the neglect of “retroactivity.”44 Alternatively, in
38

SAMPFORD, supra note 2, at 17.
Prebble, et. al., supra note 3, at 20.
40
Id. at 24.
41
Id. at 25.
42
See Deák, supra note 7, at 540-1 (“A tax law that provides during the tax year
subsequently for the taxation of the income derived during the year cannot be considered
as retroactive [and is instead permissible retrospective legislation] . . . because the process
of earning income under taxation has not yet been closed by a tax return to be filed
following the year in which the taxable income is derived.”). See also Påhlsson, supra
note 8, at 272 (discussing Swedish constitutional prohibition on retroactive tax legislation).
43
Pauwels, supra note 7, at 270.
44
Salembier, supra note 3, at 112-6. For a detailed discussion on the presumption, see
JURATOWITCH, supra note 2, at 67-118.
39

12

U. OF PENNSYLVANIA EAST ASIA LAW REVIEW Vol. 10

the U.S., where the rule is known as the presumption against
statutory “retroactivity,” the conceptual distinction of “primary
retroactivity” and “secondary retroactivity” enjoyed considerable—
if ultimately temporary—usage in the literature.45
In Hong Kong, an English common law jurisdiction, 46 the
salience of the common law doctrine of the “presumption against
retrospectivity” most likely explains why “retrospective” is
commonly employed to describe laws that are otherwise clearly
“retroactive.” For example, in the context of drafting a law that was
going to be expressly backdated, questions were raised in the
legislative process about existing laws that have “retrospective
effects.”47 This concern prompted the administration to produce a
list of legislation where the stipulated effective dates preceded the
date of enactment/amendment.48 This usage of “retrospective” is
perpetuated by legal professionals, with the Law Society of Hong
Kong raising, in the same context, the “question of the
constitutionality of making the [law] retrospective.”49

45

See Fisch, supra note 3, at 1067-9 (discussing and rejecting the conceptual dichotomy).
In Germany, the distinction is between “real” retroactivity and “apparent” retroactivity:
Georg Nolte & Peter Radler, German Public Law Cases in 1996/97, in 3 EUR. PUB. L. 489,
495 (1997).
46
Johannes Chan, The Judiciary, in LAW OF THE HONG KONG CONSTITUTION 289, 289
(Johannes Chan & C.L. Lim eds., 2011).
47

E.g., Stamp Duty (Amendment) (No. 2) Bill 2010 Bills Committee, Responses
to Follow-up Actions Arising from Discussion at the Meeting on 9 February 2011,
Summary of Views Submitted by Organizations/Individuals on the Stamp Duty
(Amendment)(No.2) Bill 2010, Legislative Council, CB(1) 1689/10-11(04) (2010)
(H.K.). See also Official Record of Proceedings, Legislative Council, 7443,
7550-7553 (Jun, 14, 2000) (H.K.) (discussing the retrospective effect of the
Family Status Discrimination (Amendment) Bill in 2000).
48
Summary of Views Submitted by Organizations/Individuals on the Stamp Duty
(Amendment) (No.2) Bill 2010, Legislative Council, CB(1) 1689/10-11(04), at 18
(2010) (H.K.).
48
The Stamp Duty (Amendment) (No. 2) Bill 2010 Bills Committee, supra note
47; Stamp Duty (Amendment) (No. 2) Bill 2010 Bills Committee, Responses to
Follow-up Actions Arising from Discussion at the Meetings on 17 and 21
December 2010 (Part II), Legislative Council, CB(1)1125/10-11(01), at 2 (2011)
(H.K.).
49
Stamp Duty (Amendment) (No. 2) Bill 2010 Bills Committee, Summary of
Views Submitted by Organizations/Individuals on the Stamp Duty (Amendment)
(No. 2) Bill 2010, Legislative Council, CB(1) 1698/10-11(04), at 18 (2010) (H.K.).
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For the purpose of this Article, the precise nuances of the
definitional distinction between “retrospective” and “retroactive”
are immaterial because legislation by press releases would clearly
satisfy even the narrower category of “retroactive” laws, given the
explicit backdating of the effective statutory date. This Article
utilizes the term “retrospective” partly to synchronize with the usage
in Hong Kong and partly to reflect this Article’s inclination that
addressing the broader concept of “retrospectivity” is normatively
more meaningful than trying to carve out a separate conceptual
category of “retroactivity.”50
B. General Concerns about Retrospective Laws
Regardless of the precise definition and understanding of
“retrospective”/“retroactive” laws, it is indisputable that such laws
are generally viewed with great hostility. Charles Sampford
candidly observed that “[n]othing is more certain to cause
apoplectic explosions of fear and loathing among some lawyers than
the mere mention of the dreaded word ‘retrospectivity.’”51 This
homage to the negative image of retrospective laws is typically the
starting point, especially common in academic literature that has
sought—perhaps somewhat ironically—to present a more nuanced
approach towards retrospectivity.52 Even in the absence of explicit
legal prohibition of retrospective laws, retrospectivity is often a
50

See notes and text accompanying Infra VI. Cf., (stray signal?) while Juratowitch argues
the opposite (that “intertemporal effects of “retrospectivity” are meaningfully different to
retroactivity – so different as to demand separate categorization”), his discussions about the
various rationales for the presumption against “retroactivity” (such as certainty, negative
liberty, fair warning and defeasiblity) is equally applicable to “retrospectivity.” See
JURATOWITCH, supra note 2, at 12 & 43-65.
51
SAMPFORD, supra note 2, at 1.
52
The central thesis of Charles Sampford’s book is that while the importance of the
reliance interest weighs generally against retrospective laws, this factor is neither
overwhelming nor unequivocal and the same reliance interest may be used to justify
retrospective law. SAMPFORD, supra note 2, at 7. For other examples, see JURATOWITCH,
supra note 2 (examining the circumstances in which the presumption against
retrospectivity may be justifiably rebutted); Pauwels, supra note 7 (discussing without
strong criticism the European Court of Human Rights ambivalent and context sensitive
treatment of retrospective laws); Prebble et. al., supra note 3 (arguing that retrospective
laws are neither illegal or unconstitutional under New Zealand law, and are at times
justified). Cf. PAUL CRAIG ROBERTS & LAWRENCE M. STRATTON, THE TYRANNY OF GOOD
INTENTIONS 67-8 (2000) (arguing that retrospective laws, including those imposing
monetary losses from civil liability, are plainly undesirable).
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cause for concern, especially in statutory law. The common law
doctrine of the presumption against retrospectivity in statutory
interpretation is precisely intended to compel the legislature to
directly confront the issue of retrospectivity. 53 In Australia,
retrospectivity in the legislation bill is routinely grounds for
objection by the Senate Standing Committee for the Scrutiny of
Bills, the committee in the upper house of the bicameral
parliamentary system that is responsible for vetting legislation.54 In
the Netherlands, a memorandum setting out guidelines limiting the
use of retrospective statues was issued by the government in
response to “serious concerns” by Parliament.55 Similarly, in Hong
Kong, retrospectivity—especially for explicit legislative
backdating—invites scrutiny occasionally.56
The central theme of the various objections to retrospective
laws is people’s reliance on the law as a guide for their conduct.57
Closely connected to the notion of the rule of law,58 the normative
principle is that private individuals should be able determine the
legal consequences of their intended activities and arrange their
affairs accordingly. Given their nature of being subsequently
created legal rules that seek to alter the legal consequences of past
actions, retrospective laws run afoul of this normative principle
because private individuals cannot possibly be “guided” by laws
that do not yet exist.59 This situation also gives rise to possible

53

JURATOWITCH, supra note 2, at 68-71; Salembier, supra note 3, at 112-8.
CHARLES SAMPFORD, supra note 2, at 160-2; Palmer & Sampford, supra note 3, at 268;
Stewart & Walker, supra note 8, at 239-40. For a discussion of the Australian Senate’s
role and power in Australian legislative process, see PATRICK KEYZER, PRINCIPLES OF
AUSTRALIAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 52-53 (2010); Stewart & Walker, supra note 8, at 2047.
55
Gribnau, supra note 31, at 71-2.
56
See notes and text accompanying infra IV.B.4.
57
GOLDING, supra note 5, at 246; JURATOWITCH, supra note 2, at 44-64; SAMPFORD, supra
note 2, at 77; Fisch, supra note 3, at 1084-5; Prebble, et. al., supra note 3, at 19; Salembier,
supra note 3, at 106-7.
58
For a discussion about relationship between rule of law and retrospective law, see
GOLDING, supra note 5, at 240-52; SAMPFORD, supra note 2, at 77-98; Gribnau, supra note
31, at 53.
59
GOLDING, supra note 5, at 250; JURATOWITCH, supra note 2, at 44-64; SAMPFORD, supra
note 2, at 77; Bernitz, supra note 3, at 43; Pauwels, supra note 7, at 268; Prebble, Prebble
& Smith, supra note 3, at 19; Salembier, supra note 3, at 106-7.
54
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injustice when the individuals’ expectations in relation to the legal
consequences of their actions are disrupted.60
Other ancillary objections to retrospective laws include
arguments based on democracy and certainty. The democracy
objection charges that a government exceeds the temporal limits on
the government mandate when it enacts retrospective laws
overriding decisions of a previous government.61 Nonetheless, the
objection would apply neither to situations in which the prior
government is not democratic nor to retrospective legislation whose
backdating effects still fall within the tenure of the enacting the
government—as is typical of legislation by press release. 62 The
certainty objection is related both to the rule of law considerations
regarding reliance on laws for guidance and to the economic
considerations regarding the distortion of incentives to invest. 63
Under this argument, the permissible use of retrospective laws
generates uncertainty for individuals attempting to plan their
activities, leading to the dilution of the guidance function of the
existing laws and underinvestment on account of these uncertainties.
On the economic considerations front, scholars in the United States
employing economic analysis have argued that the uncertainty
generated by expressly retrospective laws is no less than that of
nominally prospective laws that affect activities of a substantial time
horizon,64 whereas Louis Kaplow further argued that there is no real
difference between uncertainties due to legal change and
uncertainties due to ordinary market fluctuation.65
C. Legislation by Press Release

60

GOLDING, supra note 5, at 251; JURATOWITCH, supra note 2, at 45; ROBERTS & STRATTON,
supra note 52, at 67-8; SAMPFORD, supra note 2, at 87-95; Gribnau, supra note 31, at 70-1.
61
SAMPFORD, supra note 2, at 68-70; Fisch, supra note 3, at 1121; Palmer & Sampford,
supra note 3, at 225-6; Prebble et al., supra note 3, at 46-7.
62
SAMPFORD, supra note 2, at 71-2; Palmer & Sampford, supra note 3, at 225-6.
63
; JURATOWITCH, supra note 2, at 48-9; ROBERTS & STRATTON, supra note 52, at 75-6;
Gribnau, supra note 31, at 70-1; Kaplow, supra note 28, at 522-32.
64
Fisch, supra note 3, at 1089-91; Ann Woolhandler, Public Rights, Private Rights, and
Statutory Retroactivity, 94 GEO. L. J. 1015, 1016, 1022-3 (2006); DANIEL SHAVIRO, WHEN
RULES CHANGE: AN ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL ANALYSIS OF TRANSITION RELIEF AND
RETROACTIVITY 16-32 (2000).
65
Kaplow, supra note 28, at 533-6. For critical analysis of this view, see SAMPFORD, supra
note 2, at 238-40.
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The BSD, notwithstanding the undeniably explicit
retrospective effect, is distinct from conventional retrospective laws.
The effective date of the implementation, while being set at a date
prior to the enactment, is only backdated to the date in which there
was an express public announcement by the government declaring
its implementation. This practice of “legislation by press release”
mitigates the reservations of retrospective laws while introducing
new concerns. Given the central theme of protecting the rational
and legitimate expectations underpinning the objections to
retrospective laws, the public statement by the government
announcing—prospectively, no less—changes to the law ensures
that private individuals will not be caught off guard by the
subsequent legal changes that will be retrospectively applied to the
date of the announcement. 66 As Charles Sampford stated, “no
reasonable person would rely on a law remaining the same when the
Minister has specifically said that it will be changed.”67
However, this advance notice comes at a price. There are
two new objections that apply specifically to legislation by press
release that are not applicable to other retrospective laws. The first
is uncertainty in relation to the government announcement.68 Given
the typical scenario in which the draft bill will not be ready for
presentation at the time of announcement, there is likely going to be
uncertainty as to the precise details of the final legislation. 69
Moreover, excessive delay 70 and the possibility of subsequent
amendments to the draft bill will further complicate any attempted
prediction. This situation may not always be undesirable, especially
in the context of tax legislation for which legislation by press
release is most commonly used. Seeking out loopholes through a
literalist interpretation of the tax law is neither a legitimate
expectation to be protected nor a desirable behavior to be
encouraged.71 This objection is also resolved if the announcement
is made sufficiently clear.72
66

SAMPFORD, supra note 2, at 157; Palmer & Sampford, supra note 3, at 263; Pauwels,
supra note 7, at 278.
67
SAMPFORD, supra note 2, at 157.
68
SAMPFORD, supra note 2, at 158-9; Hayes & Wilson, supra note 8, at 52.
69
SAMPFORD, supra note 2, at 158; Hayes & Wilson, supra note 8, at 53.
70
SAMPFORD, supra note 2, at 161-2; Palmer & Sampford, supra note 3, at 268.
71
SAMPFORD, supra note 2, at 159; Palmer & Sampford, supra note 3, at 267-8. See also Ji
Lian Yap, De Facto Directors and Corporate Directorships, 2012 J. BUS. L. 579, 586-7
(2012) (observing how the ambiguity in the current legal definition of de facto director
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The other concern with legislation by press release is the de
facto exercise of legislative power by the executive branch in light
of how the announcement substantially shapes the behaviors of
private individuals as if it were a duly enacted law.73 Although the
legislature still technically has the final say as to whether the law
should be enacted, such practice “places the Parliament in the
invidious position of either agreeing to the legislation without
significant amendment or bearing the odium of overturning
arrangements which many people may have made in reliance on the
Ministerial announcement.”74
Commentators in various jurisdictions have observed the
increasingly prevalent use of such a legislative “mechanism.”75 One
key reason is the ability of legislation by press release to effect de
facto legal changes immediately, which is especially necessary in
situations in which private entities can circumvent the policy
objective by shifting forward activities that would otherwise be
affected by the announced change in law.76 Another likely reason is
that, when retrospective legislation is expedient or necessary,77 the
provision of an announcement helps mitigate the political pressure
and/or public backlash that might otherwise be generated by the use
of retrospective laws. Indeed, in Hong Kong, the government has
expressly relied on public notification through policy announcement
when defending legislative amendments that are to be backdated.78
Likewise, in Sweden, an exception to the general prohibition of
under U.K. company law is arguably necessary to preserve the doctrine’s usefulness in
order to impose liability on a director on those who acted as such while avoiding a formal
title). Cf. Leigh Osofsky, The Case Against Strategic Tax Law Uncertainty, 64 TAX. L.
REV. 489, 493 (2011) (discussing the perverse incentives under strategic tax law
uncertainty that can thwart the objective of reducing tax evasion).
72
Pauwels, supra note 7, at 278.
73
SAMPFORD, supra note 2, at 160-1; Palmer & Sampford, supra note 3, at 264-5.
74
SAMPFORD, supra note 2, at 160 (quoting the Senate Standing Committee for the
Scrutiny of Bills).
75
In Australia, the use of these legislative mechanisms has been prevalent since the late
1970s. Stewart & Walker, supra note 8, at 239; SAMPFORD, supra note 2, at 156. In Canada,
see Salembier, supra note 3, at 107. In the U.K., see Infobank, supra note 9, at 176-7. In
Sweden, see Påhlsson, supra note 8, at 274.
76
SAMPFORD, supra note 2, at 157; Fisch, supra note 3, at 1089; Palmer & Sampford,
supra note 3, at 264. See also Jaconelli, supra note 8, at 738-40 (discussing the problem of
“forestalling” by private entities in response to knowledge of pending tax). See infra V.B.2.
77
Cf. notes and text accompanying infra V.B.1.
78
Stamp Duty (Amendment) (No. 2) Bill 2010 Bills Committee, supra note 49, at 18.
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retroactive tax legislation is carved out for what is essentially
legislation by press release.79

III. THE CASE STUDY OF HONG KONG’S BSD
Having examined the relevant theoretical framework, this
part turns to the recent implementation of the BSD in Hong Kong as
a case study for examining in detail the legal and normative
considerations of legislation by press release.
A. Regulating the Vibrant Property Market
Property is a source of wealth in Hong Kong, an autonomous
jurisdiction under the sovereignty of China since its handover from
British colonial rule in 1997.80 With over seven million people
packed into an economically vibrant jurisdiction of a mere 1104
square kilometers,81 real estate is not regarded merely as places for
residential or commercial purposes but as a vehicle for investment
and speculation.82 Property booms and busts have dotted the recent
history of Hong Kong.83 Although the government is not oblivious
to the threat posed by property speculation on the stability of
financial institutions and the affordability of housing, 84 past
measures to regulate excessive property speculation have typically
focused on restrictions on financing85 and the direct provision of

79

Tax legislation can be retrospective to the date in which the “government issues a
communication to Parliament.” Påhlsson, supra note 8, at 272; Bernitz, supra note 3, at 47
(emphasis in the original).
80
Johannes Chan, From Colony to Special Administrative Region, in LAW OF THE HONG
KONG CONSTITUTION 3, 28-9 (Johannes Chan & C.L. Lim eds., 2011).
81
Hong
Kong
2012:
The
Facts,
available
at
http://www.yearbook.gov.hk/2012/en/pdf/Facts.pdf (last visited Jan. 1, 2014).
82
Indeed, local academic Lawrence Law opined that rights to land is treated as merely a
commodity in Hong Kong, subjected to compensation for the sake of building of more new
urban space, but without due regard to the landowner’s negative right to not use the land
for profit or the aspect of land as a genuine public good. Lawrence W. C. Lai, A Model of
Planning by Contract: Integrating Comprehensive State Planning, Freedom of Contract,
Public Participation and Fidelity, 81 TOWN PLANNING REV. 647, 667 (2010).
83
Kueh & Ng, supra note 20, at 392.
84
Berry F.C. Hsu, Asset Quality in HKSAR’s Real Estate Markets: A Public Policy and
Legal Analysis, 19 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 263, 269-70 (2002).
85
Kueh & Ng, supra note 20, at 392.
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subsidized public housing. 86 The Hong Kong government has
previously avoided the use of direct taxation on property and
property transactions as a regulatory tool (as opposed to revenue
generation), reflecting the low-tax policies rooted in colonial times
and later enshrined in the Basic Law87 as well as the “free market”
ideology ostensibly advocated by the Hong Kong Government.88
The high prices and high transaction volume driven by speculation
also arguably create a perverse incentive for the government to
acquiesce to such a practice in the context where land sales and
other land-associated revenues are dominant sources of government
revenue.89
The first use of property tax to regulate the property market
occurred in 2010. The property market, after a temporary setback
due to the 2008 financial crisis, had begun a rapid ascent due to a
potent mix of external factors that included the low interest rate
supported by U.S. quantitative easing, the flood of foreign capital
seeking safe havens, and the involuntary depreciation of the HK
currency, which remains pegged to the U.S. dollar.90 In November
2010, the government implemented the Special Stamp Duty
(“SSD”), a transaction tax of up to 15% of the property value if a
residential property is sold within a stipulated period after
acquisition. 91 This anti-speculation tax, together with other
86

Lai, supra note 82, at 665; Louis Augustin-Jean, Urban Planning in Hong Kong and
Integration with the Pearl River Delta: A Historical Account of Local Development, 62
GEOJOURNAL 1, 4 (2005).
87
Richard Cullen et al., Fiscal Policy and Financial System, in LAW OF THE HONG KONG
CONSTITUTION 321, 340 (Johannes Chan & C.L. Lim eds., 2011); Hsu, supra note 84, at
268.
88
ELIZA W.Y. LEE ET AL., PUBLIC POLICYMAKING IN HONG KONG: CIVIC ENGAGEMENT AND
STATE-SOCIETY RELATIONS IN A SEMI-DEMOCRACY 77-8 ( 2013); Augustin-Jean, supra note
86, at 4; Hsu, supra note 84, at 264.
89
Lai, supra note 82, at 665; C. Y. Jim, Planning Strategies to Overcome Constraints on
Greenspace Provision in Urban Hong Kong, in 73(2) THE TOWN PLANNING REVIEW 127,
146 (2002); Hsu, supra note 84, at 269.
90
Official Record of Proceedings, Legislative Council, 3319, 3442 (Dec. 8, 2010) (H.K.);
Official Record of Proceedings, Legislative Council, 2463, 2541-2 (Nov. 24, 2010) (H.K.).
Official Record of Proceedings, Legislative Council, 3319, 3442 (Dec. 8, 2010) (H.K.);
Official Record of Proceedings, Legislative Council, 2463, 2541-2 (Nov. 24, 2010) (H.K.);
see generally Kueh & Ng, supra note 20 (discussing the impact of the U.S. dollar peg on
the different aspects of the Hong Kong economy).
91
Official Record of Proceedings, Legislative Council, 3319, 3440-2 (Dec. 8, 2010)
(H.K.); Dennis Eng et al., Property Speculators Slapped with up to 15pc Extra Stamp Duty,
S. CHINA MORNING POST, Nov. 20, 2010, at 1. See also Stamp Duty Ordinance, (1997) Cap.
117, § 29CA (H.K.) (presenting the finalized version of ordinance).
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measures targeting property financing,92 failed to stem the rapid rise
in property prices 93 or to placate the increasingly vocal public
discontent over housing affordability.94 This situation led to the
enhancement in the SSD and the imposition of the BSD two years
later.
B. The Buyer’s Stamp Duty
At 6 p.m. on October 27, 2012, Financial Secretary John
Tsang Chun-Wah made a sudden and unexpected announcement
regarding the introduction of two tax measures to cool the property
market.95 First, a new BSD of 15% of the property value would be
imposed on all residential property purchases by entities that were
not Hong Kong permanent residents. Second, the existing SSD
would be enhanced in terms of the maximum rate payable (by five
percentage points) and the applicable duration (by one year).96 The
measures would be effective from midnight on the date of the
announcement, leaving a mere window of six hours between the
announcement and the measures’ implementation.97
The BSD is a potent form of taxation that is regarded by
market watchers as tough.98 The Financial Secretary described the
taxes
as
“extraordinary
measures
under
exceptional
99
circumstances” to “prevent even further exuberance in the housing
market” and to “accord priority to [Hong Kong permanent resident]
92

See, e.g., Official Record of Proceedings, Legislative Council, 9037, 9157-8 (Apr. 13,
2011) (H.K.); Eng, et al., supra note 91 (noting that the Monetary Authority reduced the
maximum allowable loan to value ratio and required banks to conduct more stringent stress
tests).
93
Official Record of Proceedings, Legislative Council, 9037, 9157-8 (Apr. 13, 2011)
(H.K.) (observing that despite the SSD reducing the number of short-term speculative
activities measured in terms of confirmed transactions, property prices have not declined).
94
Thousands Join in Property Price Protest in Hong Kong, W. MORNING NEWS (U.K.),
July 2, 2011, at 14.
95
Ng et al., supra note 15.
96
Holland, supra note 14.
97
Ng et al., supra note 15.
98
Id.; see also Transport and Housing Bureau, The Administration’s Response to the Issues
Raised at the Meeting of the Bills Committee on the Stamp Duty (Amendment) Bill 2012
Held on 25 January 2013, Jan. 29, 2013, LC Paper No: CB(1) 511/12-13(02), Annex C at
8-10 (setting out the overseas experiences in relation to the purchase of residential
properties by non-locals and noting that Singapore was the first jurisdiction to introduce
property transactions that specifically target non-residents in December 2011, with Macau
following Hong Kong’s implementations just a few days thereafter).
99
Ng et al., supra note 15.
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buyers over [non-Hong Kong permanent resident] buyers.” 100
Indeed, property purchases by non-permanent residents had
increased from 5.7% of new-home purchases in 2008 to 19.5% in
2011.101 There was also arguably a political motivation to pander to
the anti-mainland sentiment, 102 with the increasing presence of
Chinese mainlanders in the Hong Kong property market, who
accounted for 42.3% of the purchases of new homes worth HKD 12
million or more in the preceding quarter.103
The announcement of these tax measures sparked a frantic
flurry of activity by developers and purchasers seeking to avoid the
tax before midnight. The launch of a major residential project was
swiftly brought forward in one day to meet the onrushing scramble
of purchasers, with 100 flats sold by 10 p.m.—a mere four hours
after the announcement.104 Similar moves were made by other
developers as well.105 Mainland purchasers were also reportedly
rushing from the neighboring Chinese city of Shenzhen to beat the
deadline. 106 This surge in last-minute property purchases was
followed by a subsequent plunge in transactions arising from the
decrease in buyers’ interest (especially non-residents) and the
withdrawal of units by sellers in anticipation of a fall in price.107
C. The Protracted Legislative Process
After the initial excitement (or agitation) subsided, the focus
of the inquiry shifted to the details of the measures. This curious
outcome was the result of not only the absence of effective
legislation to accompany the announcement of the tax measures on
100

Transport and Housing Bureau, Legislative Council Brief: Further Measures to Address
the Overheated Property Market, Oct. 26, 2012, at 3.
101
Joyce Ng, et al., Non-locals Hit with New Property Tax, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Oct.
27, 2012, at 1. See also Sandy Li & Peggy Sito, New Levy will Reduce Sales and Prices, S.
CHINA MORNING POST, Oct. 27, 2012, at 3 (noting that companies accounted for 9.7% of
home sales in the first three quarters of 2012).
102
Johnny Tam & Tony Cheung, Levy May Hit Genuine Residents Too, S. CHINA
MORNING POST, Oct. 28, 2012, at 3 (citing political analyst James Sung Lap-kung as
supporting this proposition).
103
Li & Sito, supra note 101.
104
Yvonne Lou, et al.,, Buyers in Midnight Dash for Yuen Long Flats, S. CHINA MORNING
POST, Oct. 27, 2012, at 3.
105
Id.
106
Ng et al., supra note 15.
107
Leung, supra note 18; Sito, supra note 18.
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October 27, 2012, but also the lack of a draft bill. Indeed, the
preparation of the draft bill—the Stamp Duty (Amendment) Bill
2012 [the Bill]—only began after the announcement and was
completed two months thereafter.108 The government did upload, in
conjunction with the initial announcement, an admirably detailed
FAQ outlining the specifics and illustrative examples of the pending
legislation on the Inland Revenue Department website. 109
Nevertheless, the FAQ attracted a fair amount of scrutiny on the
purported ambiguity of certain provisions.110
In light of the ongoing legislative process, it is not surprising
that interest groups and their corresponding legislators were actively
lobbying for all sorts of variations. Many of the efforts were
directed at diluting the effect of the BSD through the creation of
additional exemptions. From the outset, there was a push for an
exemption for companies that were owned by permanent
residents.111 The Real Estate Developers Association, a powerful
interest group that represents the interests of developers, sent an
open letter to the government requesting an exemption of luxury
flats of more than HKD30 million, 112 and later requested an
exemption for local companies 113 and then for small local
companies with no more than five shareholders. 114 Abraham
Razack, a functional group legislator representing the real estate and
construction sectors,115 similarly expressed vocal opposition to the
108

Ng & Li, supra note 16; Ng, supra note 16.
See BUYER’S STAMP DUTY (BSD), http://www.ird.gov.hk/eng/faq/bsd.htm (last visited
Dec. 1, 2013) (providing answers to various question that may arise regarding the Buyer’s
Stamp Duty).
110
See, e.g., Transport and Housing Bureau, The Administration’s Response to the Issues
Raised at the Meeting of the Bills Committee on the Stamp Duty (Amendment) Bill 2012
Held on 18 February 2013, Apr., 2013, LC Paper No: CB(1) 893/12-13(02) at 24-7
(stating the Hong Kong Association of Banks’ suggestion that the FAQ provision in
relation to the conveyance to a financial institution to a mortgage is consistent with the
provision on the bill).
111
Ng & Li, supra note 16; Simpson Cheung, Developer Calls for New Look at Property
Taxes, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Nov. 9, 2012, at 5.
112
Peggy Sito & Ng Kang-chung, Developers Want Luxury Flats to be Exempt from Tax, S.
CHINA MORNING POST, Nov. 24, 2012, at 3 (discussing the statements of officials of the
Real Estate Developers Association that government intervention in the property market
was unhealthy and harmful to the reputation among international investors).
113
Ng & Li, supra note 16.
114
Joyce Ng, Call to Leave Local-owned Companies out of 15pc Tax, S. CHINA MORNING
POST (HK), Feb. 1, 2013, at 1.
115
Under the institutional design of the Hong Kong legislature, there are group of members
who are elected from a defined electorate that is typically based on profession or industry.
109
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measure in its entirety 116 before insisting on a local company
exemption. 117 There was also lobbying for the exemption of
purchases by charitable organizations.118 The real-estate sector even
sought support from populist legislators known for their antigovernment rhetoric.119 The government persistently resisted such
amendments due to potential circumvention and exploitation of
loopholes.120
There was lobbying in the opposite direction as well. A
lawmaker, Kenneth Leung, proposed amendments to impose a
domicile requirement—in addition to the existing permanent
resident requirement—for exemption from the BSD. 121 The
administration rejected such a requirement based on the
administrative difficulties in evaluating the context-sensitive issues
of domicile.122 Some lawmakers also suggested excluding from the
BSD exemption Hong Kong permanent residents who were minors

See generally Lam Wai-man, Hong Kong: The Hong Kong Legislative Council – Where
Politics Matters More than Size, in LEGISLATURES OF SMALL STATES: A COMPARATIVE
STUDY 137, 141-2 (Nicholas D. J. Baldwin ed., 2013); Albert Chen, Development of
Representative Government, in LAW OF THE HONG KONG CONSTITUTION 215, 243
(Johannes Chan & C.L. Lim eds., 2011). For more analysis on the political infrastructure
and dynamic in Hong Kong, see infra V.C.2.
116
Luisa Tam, Home Truth, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Dec. 5, 2012, at 48.
117
Sandy Li, New Property Taxes Still in Limbo, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Oct. 9, 2013, at
1.
118
Transport and Housing Bureau, The Government’s Response to the Issues Raised at the
Meetings of the Bills Committee on the Stamp Duty (Amendment) Bill 2012 Held on 8 July
2013, July 8, 2013, LC Paper No: CB(1) 1618/12-13(02) at 1; Li, supra note 117; Ng
Kang-chung, Cooling Measures ‘Unfair to Locals’, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Sep. 17,
2013, at 5.
119
Ng Kang-chung, Property Sector Turns to Radicals in Tax Fight, S. CHINA MORNING
POST, Sep. 16, 2013, at 4.
120
See Transport and Housing Bureau, The Government’s Response to the Issues Raised at
the Meetings of the Bills Committee on the Stamp Duty (Amendment) Bill 2012 Held on 16
September 2013, Sep. 16, 2013, LC Paper No: CB(1) 1843/12-13(02) at 1-3 (rejecting the
argument that companies owned by Hong Kong permanent residents should be exempted
from the Buyer’s Stamp Duty because these exemptions would create loopholes, which
would require significant changes to the current tax system to eliminate); Transport and
Housing Bureau, supra note 118 (discussing the difficulties that would arise in determining
the actual use of a property if charitable organizations were exempted from the Buyer’s
Stamp Duty).
121
Transport and Housing Bureau, The Government’s Response to the Draft Committee
Stage Amendments Proposed by the Hon Kenneth Leung, Nov. 2013, LC Paper No: CB(1)
337/13-14(01) at 1.
122
Id.
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but whose parents were not Hong Kong permanent residents.123
This proposal was again rejected due to concerns of discriminatory
effects against the targeted Hong Kong permanent residents that
might infringe on the right to equality.124 Nonetheless, a follow-up
recommendation to exclude all permanent residents who were
minors was eventually taken up by the government in January
2014. 125 This proposal did raise concerns about whether this
withdrawal of the exemption should be retrospectively applied to
the date of announcement given the substantial departure from the
initial announcement. 126 The government insisted on full
retrospective effect based on the purported concerns of
circumvention and narrowly survived an attempted amendment that
would have rendered this withdrawal prospective.127
Two other significant but politically less salient changes
were made to the final legislation as a result of the legislative
process.
The first change related to the exemption for
redevelopment, wherein the government indicated in its
announcement that purchases of property by developers for the
purpose of redevelopment would be exempted from the BSD.128
The proposed six-year limitation under the Bill was dropped in
favor of requiring demonstrable evidence of redevelopment for a
refund of the BSD—a change that would potentially allow for a

123

Transport and Housing Bureau, The Administration’s Response to the Issues Raised at
the Meetings of the Bills Committee on the Stamp Duty (Amendment) Bill 2012 Held on 15
October 2013, Oct. 2013, LC Paper No: CB(1) 133/13-14(2) at 2.
124
Id.
125
Transport and Housing Bureau, The Government’s Response to the Committee Stage
Amendment Proposed by the Hon Regina IP, Jan., 2014, LC Paper No: CB(1) 623/1314(04) at 1-2. Stamp Duty Ordinance, §§ 29CB(8)(b), 29CB(9)(b), 29DB(9)(b) &
29DB(10)(b), supra note 91 (excluding minors from the category of persons exempted
from the Buyer’s Stamp Duty by eliminating the term “minor” from the statutory
language); Stamp Duty (Amendment) Ordinance, No. 2, (2014), §§ 10 & 13 (eliminating
the term minor from the Stamp Duty Ordinance); Stamp Duty (Amendment) Bill, (2012)
§§ 9 & 12 (replacing previous statutory language with new provisions excluding minors
from the category of persons exempted from the Buyer’s Stamp Duty).
126
Official Record of Proceedings, Legislative Council 7302 (Feb. 19, 2014) (H.K.).
127
Stamp Duty (Amendment) Bill 2012 – Committee Stage – Hon Dennis Kwok’s 2nd
Amendment to Clause 17, Feb. 21, 2014, Vote 13 (passing by a margin of one vote among
the 27 Functional Legislative Council members and 24 Geographical Legislative Council
members).
128
Ng & Li, supra note 16; Yvonne Liu, Sino Land Plans Unaffected by Cooling Measures,
S. CHINA MORNING POST, Nov. 1, 2012, at 1.
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speedier refund process.129 The second change concerned the scope
of exemptions for a non-Hong Kong permanent resident who
purchased a replacement property after the resident’s initial
residential property was involuntarily sold.130 The exemption was
expanded to cover a broader spectrum of circumstances after the
government accepted the submissions of the Law Society of Hong
Kong.131
Delay in the legislative process – in part due to an unrelated
filibuster by opposition lawmakers, but mainly due to a lack of
agreement among the legislators on the substantive rules – resulted
in the Bill being stuck in the legislative process for fifteen months
following the announcement of the tax measures. 132 The
government’s intense lobbying and political jostling among the
political parties in the legislature culminated in extended three-day
marathon sessions for the second and third readings of the relevant
bill that had commentators raving with speculation about the
prospect of the Bill’s passage.133 Indeed, as the scheduled date for
the second and third readings of the Bill drew closer, a final issue
emerged as the dominant political talking point—namely, the
provision that would empower the Financial Secretary to make any
future changes to the rates of the BSD and SSD by unilateral
announcement in the Gazette without the need for additional

129

See Stamp Duty Ordinance, § 29DD, supra note 91; Stamp Duty (Amendment)
Ordinance 2014, § 13, supra note 125; Stamp Duty (Amendment) Bill 2012, § 12, supra
note 125.
130
Transport and Housing Bureau, The Administration’s Response to the Issues Raised at
the Meeting of the Bills Committee on the Stamp Duty (Amendment) Bill 2012 Held on 20
May 2013 and the Submission from the Law Society of Hong Kong of 28 May 2013, May
28CB(1) 1288/12-13(01), 98 (June, 2013) at 1-4.
131
Id.; Stamp Duty Ordinance, §§ 29CB (4) & 29DB(5), supra note 91; Stamp Duty
(Amendment) Ordinance 2014, §§ 10 & 13, supra note 125; Stamp Duty (Amendment)
Bill 2012 §§ 9 & 12, supra note 125 (expanding the Buyer’s Stamp Duty to include
acquisitions made under the Mass Transit Railway (Land Resumption and Related
Provisions) Ordinance, Roads (Works, Use and Compensation) Ordinance, Railways
Ordinance, Land Acquisitions (Possessory Title) Ordinance, and the Land Drainage
Ordinance) (H.K.).
132
See Li, supra note 117, at 1; Yongsi, supra note 17, at A1; Filibuster of Property
Cooling Measures Causes Backlog of Several Hundred Millions of Tax, supra note 20.
133
See Shuanglazhao xiuding nan guoguan [Amendment of Double Cooling Measures
Unlikely to Pass], H.K. ECON. J., Feb. 11, 2014, at A1; Zhang Weiwei, “Shuangla” erdu,
gangfu jianjue “chuangguan” [Second Reading of “Double Cooling Measures” –
Government Insistence to Push Ahead], SINGTAO DAILY, Feb. 19, 2014, at A8.
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legislative authorization.134 This empowerment provision attracted
allegations of “administrative tyranny” and threats to veto the entire
Bill by certain political parties.135 The government attempted to
placate the objections with a last minute “oral undertaking” to still
consult the legislature for upward revisions of rates,136 which only
served to generate even more controversy.137 Ultimately, the Bill
with the three changes to the exemptions of redevelopment,
replacement and Hong Kong permanent residents minors discussed
above, was passed on February 22, 2014, and was registered in the
Gazette (becoming law) on February 28, 2014.138
D. The Aftermath: Real Effect of the Yet Effective Law
Despite the BSD amendment languishing in the legislative
process for more than a year after the announcement, the impact of
the measures was keenly and immediately felt by all relevant parties
from the announcement date. First, lawyers handling property
transactions began collecting these pending taxes for eventual
possible payment to the government.139 This move resulted in funds

134

Stamp Duty (Amendment) Bill 2012, § 16 (H.K.). Under the current administrative law
framework, the Legislative Council will be presented with the subsidiary legislation (the
definition of which includes notice to change the rates) at the earliest opportunity and may
amend or repeal the subsidiary legislation by resolution). See Interpretation and General
Clauses Ordinance, § 34, c. 1 (1997) (H.K.).
135
See Yinhua shui xiuding yiyuan chang xian shenyi hou dingli [Amendment to Stamp
Duty – LegCo Member Urges Legislative Review Before Implementation], H.K. ECON. J.,
Feb. 5, 2014, at A10; Amendment of Double Cooling Measures Unlikely to Pass, supra
note 133.
136
Zhang, supra note 133, at A8.
137
The real controversy surrounding the “oral undertaking” is more political than the
purported concerns for rule of law and/or separation of power. The oral undertaking was
given in response to the legislators from the pro-establishment political parties, which
infuriated the rival pan-democrats political parties over the perceived preferential treatment
by the government to the pro-establishment camp. The pan-democrats threatened to block
the Bill in its entirety, but ultimately chose to boycott the vote (which effectively facilitate
the passage) given the strong popular support for the Bill. See Fanmin lichang cucheng
yi’an guoguan zhengfu chanshen [Bill Passed With Absence of Pan-Democrats – A Pyrrhic
Victory for the Government], H. K. ECON. J., Feb. 24, 2014, at A4; Liang, supra note 17.
For discussion of the antagonistic political landscape in Hong Kong, see infra IV.C.2.
138
Stamp Duty (Amendment) Ordinance 2014, supra note 17. See also Liang, supra note
17, at A1.
139
See Filibuster of Property Cooling Measures Causes Backlog of Several Hundred
Millions of Tax, supra note 20; Li, supra note 117, at 1.
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amounting to several billion HKD being held up in the client
accounts of these law firms.140
Other private actors similarly modified their behavior in
response to the pending law. Some developers offered discounts
designed to partially or completely offset the pending increase in the
tax burden. 141 Other developers increased the commission to
property agents to help push the inventory. 142 New land sales
understandably saw more conservative bids. 143 Developers also
changed the designs of new projects—such as reducing the number
of “super luxury” features—in anticipation of the dampened interest
by cash-rich foreign buyers.144 Redevelopment plans by private
developers were derailed by the increase in upfront acquisition cost
and the reduction in output demand. Moreover, investment shifted
to industrial and commercial properties, which would not be
affected by the BSD and SSD.145
Foreign buyers explored measures for avoiding the taxes,
such as purchasing property via share transfers (if the property was
owned by a company), although there were additional transaction
costs to verify the account and liability of the property-holding
company.146 This practice was also adopted by some developers for
their remaining unsold apartments.147 There was also a shift in

140

Id.; See Financial Secretary Warning: Vetoing Cooling Measures Would Result in
Tumor in Property and Stock Market, supra note 20, at A4.
141
See Kenneth Ko, Sweet Deals, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Nov. 1, 2013, at 1. See also
Leung, supra note 18 (offering 15% discount for remaining flats); Sandy Li, Rivalry Fuels
Fears over Price Cuts, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Oct. 12, 2013, at 1 (offering discount of
50% of BSD).
142
See Peggy Sito, Tax Takes Huge Toll on Sales, S. SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST, Dec.
21, 2012, at 1 (increasing commission to 5% from the previous 1-2.5%).
143
See Liu, supra note 19, at 1, 4.
144
See Li, supra note 18, at 4.
145
See Shu-ching Jean Chen, Leung Firm on Reining in HK Property Prices, BUS. TIMES,
Dec. 7, 2012; Peggy Sito, Boom in Factory Space Investors, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Jan.
30, 2013, at 1. Jimmy Chow, Chang of Pace, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Jan. 18, 2013, at
14 (noting that while an exemption would be granted for redevelopment that is completed
within 6 years upon acquisition, it is in the form of a refund, meaning that a substantial
amount of capital will be locked up).
146
See Joyce Ng & Sandy Li, Curb on Avoiding New Flat Still Leaves Tax Dodges, S.
SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST, Nov. 1, 2012, at 3.
147
See Yishou haozhai chaizhao bi qianwan yinghua sui [Avoidance of Tens of Millions of
Stamp Duty Via Countermeasures In First Hand Sales of Luxury Property], MINGPAO
(H.K.), Oct. 30, 2012.
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investment to industrial and commercial properties, which were not
affected by the BSD and SSD.148
Overall, the “yet to be implemented” BSD and SSD proved
effective in cooling the property market. The previous trend of
rising prices on secondary homes was halted amidst a substantial
decline in transaction volume.149

IV. LEGALITY OF LEGISLATION BY PRESS RELEASE
One interesting observation from the case study on the BSD
is the absence of any qualms about the legality of how the measures
were implemented.150 There was some discussion about the legality
of the substantive content of the BSD: Tom Holland opined that the
BSD might be discriminatory and infringe on the Basic Law Article
105’s right of freedom to acquire, use and dispose of property;151
Abraham Razack suggested a possible violation of equality
protection;152 and the Hong Kong Conveyancing & Property Law
Association Limited argued that the BSD restricted the policy of
free trade and contravened articles 105, 106 and 115 of the Basic
Law.153 Beyond the legality of the substantive aspects,154 the issue
of retrospectivity has largely been ignored in the discussion of the
BSD. Interestingly, the Law Society did raise the “question of the
constitutionality of making the SSD legislation retrospective”

148

Shu-ching Jean Chen, Leung Firm on Reining in HK Property Prices, BUS. TIMES
(Sing.), Dec. 7, 2012; Peggy Sito, Boom in Factory Space Investors, S. CHINA MORNING
POST, Jan. 30, 2013, at 1.
149
See Li, supra note 21; Sito & Ng, supra note 21. Property agents were particularly
hard-hit by the substantial fall in property transactions, with several public protests
organized by affected property agents. See Peggy Sito, Realty Strikes, S.SOUTH CHINA
MORNING POST, July 5, 2013, at 4.
150
Official Reports of Proceedings, Legislative Council, 12561-12564 (June 22, 2011)
(H.K.). During the 2011 legislative debate over the SSD, Dr. Margaret Ng did mount a
substantial objection over the retrospective nature of the SSD implementation.
Nonetheless, the objection was based on normative policy considerations (delay and
uncertainty) rather than on legal grounds.
151
Tom Holland, Four More Ways Officials Break the Spirit of HK’s Basic Law, S. CHINA
MORNING POST, Nov. 23, 2012, at 12.
152
Ng, supra note 118, at 5.
153
Transport and Housing Bureau, supra note 110, at 16.
154
It is worth noting that, notwithstanding the alleged severity of the legal critique
surrounding the BSD, there has been no indication or suggestion of litigation.
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during the SSD debate in 2011, but there was no further elaboration
or argument beyond that passing comment.155
This Part critically examines the legality of the manner in
which the BSD was implemented as follows: first, by setting out the
constitutional framework in Hong Kong; second, by analyzing the
issue of retrospectivity, including a discussion of previous examples
of retrospective laws in Hong Kong; and third, by examining the
ancillary issue of the power to tax. The conclusion is that legislation
by press release is legally permissible in Hong Kong.
A. Constitutional Framework in Hong Kong
The starting point for assessing legality is the constitutional
documents of a jurisdiction that set forth fundamental rights. In
Hong Kong, there are actually three possibly relevant instruments.
The first is the Basic Law, Hong Kong’s de facto constitution after
the handover from British colonial rule to China in 1997.156 The
second is the Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance, enacted in 1991
to incorporate the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights (“ICCPR”) into Hong Kong157 after the Tiananmen Square
incident in China sparked concerns about future human rights
protections after the handover.158 The third instrument is the ICCPR,
which “as applied to Hong Kong shall remain in force” under article
39 of the Basic Law.159 The precise relationship between these
three instruments is a complicated and, at times, controversial issue
for courts determining the substantive content of constitutional
rights or assessing the legality of restrictions on rights.160 As a
general matter, either the Basic Law or the Hong Kong Bill of
155

Law Society of Hong Kong, Preliminary Submissions by the Law Society’s Property
Committee on the Stamp Duty (Amendment) (No. 2) Bill 2010, CB(1) 983/10-11(01), at 9
(2011).
156
Chan, supra note 80, at 28-29.
157
Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance, supra note 22.
158
See Dinusha Panditaratne, Basic Law, Hong Kong Bill of Rights and the ICCPR, in LAW
OF THE HONG KONG CONSTITUTION 425, 431-2 (Johannes Chan & C.L. Lim eds., 2011);
Carole J. Petersen, Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity in Hong Kong: A Case for the
Strategic Use of Human Rights Treaties and the International Reporting Process, 14
ASIAN-PAC. L. & POL’Y J. 28, 42-6 (2013).
159
XIANGGANG JIBEN FA art. 39 (H.K.).
160
For a concise overview and analysis of this issue, see PETER WESLEY-SMITH,
CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW IN HONG KONG 319-27 (2d ed. 1994);
Panditaratne, supra note 158, at 436-60.
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Rights Ordinance will suffice in providing grounds for a
constitutional challenge, 161 whereas the ICCPR may serve as a
constraint against repeal or amendment of the Hong Kong Bill of
Rights Ordinance without itself providing an independent source of
enforceable rights.162
B. Retrospectivity
1. Per Se Prohibition of Retrospective Criminal Law
The relevant provision concerning retrospective law is
contained in article 12 of the Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance.
A direct replica of article 15 of the ICCPR, the provision is titled
“No retrospective criminal offences or penalties” and stipulates that:
No one shall be held guilty of any criminal offence on account of
any act or omission which did not constitute a criminal offence,
under Hong Kong or international law, at the time when it was
committed. Nor shall a heavier penalty be imposed than the one
that was applicable at the time when the criminal offence was
committed.163
This right against retrospective criminal offenses or penalties
has no counterpart in the Basic Law,164 but as noted in the preceding
section, this fact is no obstacle to the courts in striking down
retrospective punitive legislative provisions.165
The protection from retrospective laws is, however, limited only to
criminal sanctions, as is clear from a plain reading of article 12 of
161

See Johannes Chan & C.L. Lim, Interpreting Constitutional Rights and Permissible
Restrictions, in LAW OF THE HONG KONG CONSTITUTION 465, 470-1 (Johannes Chan & C.L.
Lim eds., 2011); Panditaratne, supra note 158, at 441-4; Simon N. M. Young, Restricting
Basic Law Rights in Hong Kong, 34 H.K. L. J. 109, 115-7 (2004).
162
See Panditaratne, supra note 158, at 441-2, 456-60; Young, supra note 161, at 115-7.
163
Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance, supra note 22.
164
See XIANGGANG JIBEN FA art. 24-42 (H.K.).
165
E.g., Ng Ka Ling v. Director of Immigration, [1999] 1 H.K.C.F.A.R. 315, 350-2
(C.F.A.) (challenging an amendment to the Immigration Ordinance that imposes a new
requirement of an administrative certificate for the exercise of the right of abode by certain
classes of permanent residents, thereby rendering persons without such certificate liable for
immigration – i.e. criminal – offences). See also R v. Chan Suen Hay, [1995] H.K.L.Y.
205 (D.C.) (relying on article 12(1) of the Bills of Rights Ordinance to disallow an
application for a disqualification order under a Companies Ordinance provision that was
enacted six years after the commission of the offense).
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the Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance (or, for that matter, the
international human right standards set forth in the ICCPR).
Inevitably, there is ambiguity and uncertainty on the margins as to
what constitutes a “criminal offense” or “penalty.” In Hong Kong,
the higher appellate courts have not had the opportunity to pass
judgment on this issue.166 Two lower courts have done so, though
their decisions are somewhat inconsistent. The first is a High Court
decision that found the disqualification of a driver’s license upon
the accumulation of certain traffic demerit points to be a mere civil
consequence of a criminal offence and thus did not constitute
punishment for double jeopardy purposes (i.e., Article 11(6) Hong
Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance). 167 The other is a subsequent
District Court decision, which held that a director disqualification
order under the Companies Ordinance is a penalty that cannot be
imposed if the triggering criminal offense was committed before the
enactment of the relevant Companies Ordinance provision.168
Similarly, the European Court of Human Rights and U.S.
courts have grappled with difficult cases such as whether
confiscation of property from convicted drug traffickers, mandatory
sex offender registration, indefinite civil confinement for
“dangerous” sex offenders, and other legal sanctions violate the ban
on retrospective criminal laws. 169 Nonetheless, the general
consensus among various jurisdictions is that taxation per se does
not fall within the ambit of such a ban.170

166

In the Ng Ka Ling case, neither party disputed that immigration offences would fall
within the prohibition on retrospective criminal laws, and the main was whether the
offending provision would be struck down in its entirety or interpreted to simply prohibit
retrospective prosecution. See Ng Ka Ling, supra note 165, at 350-2.
167
The Queen v. Wan Kit-man, [1992] 1 H.K.C.L.R. 225 (H.C.).
168
Chan Suen Hay, supra note 165 (distinguishing the Wan Kit-man case on the basis that
the disqualification order is discretionary, not automatic).
169
The short answers are, respectively, yes (European Court of Human Rights); no
(European Court of Human Rights and U.S. Supreme Court); and no (U.S. Supreme Court).
See SAMPFORD, supra note 2, at 135-41. For a detailed exposition on EU jurisprudence on
article 7 of the European Convention of Human Rights, which is similar to article 15 of the
ICCPR, see DAVID HARRIS ET AL., LAW OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS
331-339 (2nd ed. 2009); ROBIN C A WHITE & CLARE OVERY, THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION
ON HUMAN RIGHTS 296-304 (5th ed. 2010).
170
See generally SAMPFORD, supra note 2, at 151-6 (discussing the cases from various
jurisdictions); Fisch, supra note 3, at 1066; Palmer & Sampford, supra note 3, at 261 (“Tax
is not a penalty for earning income, nor is there any social disapproval attaching to the fact
that a demand for unpaid taxes has been made.”); Pauwels, supra note 7, at 272-3.
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2. Expanded Notion of “Law” and Proportionality
Notwithstanding the lack of per se prohibition against
retrospective civil legislation, such legislation may still be
scrutinized by the courts under judicial review of general
constitutionality. In Hong Kong,171 as similarly articulated in the
jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights, 172 and
Canadian courts,173 legislation must conform to both the principles
of legality and the requirement of proportionality. The principle of
legality arises from “prescribed by law” and similar phrases that
commonly precondition any imposition of legal burdens (including
taxes) on private entities. Courts have increasingly infused a
qualitative requirement when interpreting what constitutes “law.”
The European Court of Human Rights construed the term “law” to
require “qualitative requirements, including those of accessibility
and foreseeability.”174 A similar approach has been adopted in
Hong Kong as well.175 While more typically used to critically
evaluate regulatory/legislative schemes that accord broad
discretionary power to government officials,176 this requirement of
accessibility and foreseeability provides a potential avenue for
courts to examine retrospective civil legislation in the absence of an
express constitutional prohibition. Sir Anthony Mason, a nonpermanent Judge of the Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal and
former Chief Justice of the High Court of Australia, opined in his
academic writing on the possibility for a greater operation of the
general principle of legality under the ICCPR in challenges to
171

See Chan & Lim, supra note 161, at 487-95.
See A. W. BRADLEY & K. D. EWING, CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 681-2
(15th ed. 2011); WHITE & OVERY, supra note 169, at 312-5, 325-32, 478; ALEX CARROLL,
CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 398-400 (5th ed. 2009); STEVEN GREER, THE
EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS: ACHIEVEMENTS, PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS
201-13 (2006). For a critical discussion of the legal theory imbedded in these two concepts,
see GEORGE LETSAS, A THEORY OF INTERPRETATION OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON
HUMAN RIGHTS 17-36, 99-119 (2007).
173
See PETER W. HOGG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF CANADA 797-803, 828-829 (Student ed.,
5th ed. 2007); Barb Billingsley, Justification, in CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: CASES,
COMMENTARY AND PRINCIPLES 837, 837-60 (Leonard I. Rotman ed., 2008).
174
See HARRIS ET AL., supra note 169, at 334; WHITE & OVERY, supra note 169, at 312-5;
Bernitz, supra note 3, at 51-2.
175
See Chan & Lim, supra note 161, at 488-9. See also Lo v. H.K.S.A.R., [2012] 15
H.K.C.F.A.R. 16, 42-4 (C.F.A.); Shum Kwok Sher v. H.K.S.A.R., [2002] 2 H.K.L.R.D.
793, 810-2 (C.F.A.) (applying this approach).
176
See HOGG, supra note 173; WHITE & OVERY, supra note 169, at 314-5; Chan & Lim,
supra note 161, at 488-9.
172
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retrospective laws.177 Indeed, the European Court of Human Rights
occasionally scrutinizes retroactive tax legislation with respect to
whether it is a “lawful” interference.178
Alternatively, the use of retrospectivity may be a factor that
weighs against the principle of proportionality. This view is
similarly reflected by the European Court of Human Rights
involving retrospective tax legislation.179 For example, in M.A. v
Finland, the court held that the key issue is whether “the
retrospective application of the law imposed an unreasonable
burden on [the applicants] and thereby failed to strike a fair balance
between the various interests involved.”180 Significantly, in R.Sz. v.
Hungary, the hardship caused to private individuals who were likely
to exhaust financial resources that are subsequently subjected to
retrospective taxation was an aggravating factor, in addition to the
magnitude of the tax, in the court’s finding that the tax was not
reasonably proportionate.181
Nonetheless, the prospective notice setting out the specifics
of the pending retrospective laws under legislation by press release
is likely to substantially meet these two legal requirements.
Although private individuals may not be able to access laws that
have yet to be passed and thus are unable to foresee the legal
consequences imposed by future retrospective legislation, the same
cannot be said when the private individuals are forewarned by the
initial announcement. For the BSD, private individuals were able to
refer to the detailed implementation guidelines uploaded on the
177

See Mason, supra note 23, at 314-5. Earlier, Judge Mason had entrenched this
expanded notion of “law” in Shum Kwok Sher v. H.K.S.A.R., a Court of Final Appeal case.
Shum Kwok Sher v. H.K.S.A.R., supra note 175 at 810-2.
178
See Bernitz, supra note 3, at 50-2; Påhlsson, supra note 8, at 273; Pauwels, supra note 7,
at 272. See also Nolte & Radler, supra note 45, at 495 (noting how under German
constitutional court jurisprudence, laws which affect transactions that have been concluded
“are usually impermissible because they violate the principle of legal certainty, which is an
aspect . . . of the general principle of the rule of law”).
179
See Pauwels, supra note 7, at 276-9 (discussing the relevant cases). See also Gribnau,
supra note 31, at 71 (arguing that retrospectivity, while generally undesirable, can be
countervailed by competing interests); Nolte & Radler, supra note 45, at 495 (discussing
the treatment of retrospectivity in assessing proportionality by the German Constitutional
Court).
180
M.A. v. Finland, 37 Eur. Ct. H.R. 712 (2003).
181
R.Sz. v. Hungary, No. 41838/11, para. 59 (2013), available at
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001121958#{%22itemid%22:[%22001-121958%22]}.
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government website182 and could not claim surprise at the eventual
tax bill, especially given that they would have been amply informed
of the pending tax by property agents and the lawyer handling the
conveyance. Similarly, by minimizing the disruption of the reliance
interests of private individuals, the announcement served as an
effective counterweight to the adverse effect of retrospectivity on
the proportionality balancing test. 183 In this regard, it is worth
noting that, in M.A. v Finland, where the retrospective application
of the tax legislation had no difficulty passing the proportionality
assessment, the court found it significant that the retrospective
effect was only backdated to the introduction of the bill.184
3. Presumption Against Retrospectivity
Although the presumption against retrospectivity is not
strictly a legal prohibition capable of striking down the law, it is
worth mentioning for completeness that civil legislation will
nevertheless be subjected to this well-established common law
principle in statutory interpretation.185 The presumption has been
invoked several times in Hong Kong courts186 and is also reflected
in the statutory provision on the interpretation of statutory repeal.187
Nonetheless, it is not strictly applicable to legislation by press
release because its retrospective effects will typically be expressly
and clearly stipulated. Indeed, the preamble188 and the first clause189
182

See BUYER’S STAMP DUTY (BSD), http://www.ird.gov.hk/eng/faq/bsd.htm (last visited
Dec. 1, 2013) (providing a detailed FAQ about the BSD on the website of the Inland
Revenue Department that sets out the specifics of the legislation to accompany the policy
announcement).
183
Pauwels, supra note 7, at 278.
184
M.A., supra note 180, at 12.
185
JURATOWITCH, supra note 2, at 68-71; Salembier, supra note 3, at 112-8.
186
E.g., Lee Bing Chueng v. Sec’y for Justice, [2013] H.K.E.C. 255, 145-6, 155 (C.F.I.)
(upholding the presumption of retrospectivity partly because the plaintiff did not challenge
the concept); The Queen v. Lam Wan-kow [1992] 1 H.K.C.L.R. 272, 277 (C.A.)
(observing that there is a long established principle against presuming retrospective
operation of law unless such law indicates it should be applied retrospectively); Comm’r of
Inland Revenue v. Chan Tin-chu, [1965] D.C.L.R 289, 301 (D.C.) (noting that despite a
presumption against retrospectivity, a law can have retrospective force if it is clearly stated
within the statute).
187
Interpretation and General Clauses Ordinance, §23, supra note 134.
188
Stamp Duty (Amendment) Bill 2012, pt. 1, cl. 1 (H.K.) (“[T]o impose buyer’s stamp
duty on certain agreements for sale and conveyances on sale of residential property
executed on or after 27 October 2012”).
189
Stamp Duty (Amendment) Bill 2012, pt. 1, cl. 1(2) (H.K.) (“This Ordinance is deemed
to have come into operation on 27 October 2012”).
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of the bill implementing the BSD could not have been more explicit
about the intended retrospective operation of the amendment.
4. Previous Examples of Retrospective Laws
Given the general legality of retrospective non-criminal laws
in Hong Kong, it is not surprising that there has not been any
systematic study of the quantity and characteristics of retrospective
laws in Hong Kong.190 This section provides a brief descriptive
overview of some previous examples of retrospective laws in Hong
Kong. These examples are not meant to be comprehensive,
although they are significant, given that all of these examples were
provided by the government in response to recent queries by
legislators on the issue of retrospectivity. The examination of these
examples not only provides a more circumspect context in which to
examine Hong Kong’s utilization of legislation by press release in
particular and retrospective laws in general, but also helps us
appreciate the significant departure posed by the BSD that will be
discussed in V.B.
Although retrospectivity was not raised in the BSD, the issue
was raised in the initial implementation of the SSD in 2010. The
Law Society of Hong Kong and the Hong Kong Association of
Banks opposed the retrospective effect of the amendment. 191
Pursuant to a meeting on February 9, 2011, in which the question of
“existing ordinances other than revenue ordinances which had
retrospective effect” was raised, the Bills Committee responsible for
the stamp duty amendment responded with two examples: the
Societies Ordinance in 1988 and the Bankruptcy Ordinance in
2005.192 The latter is uncontroversial—a mere example of adaptive
amendments to update the reference of government officials and

190

Cf., SAMPFORD, supra note 2, at 104-64 (providing a study on retrospective laws
primarily in Australia, but also the U.S. and U.K.); Palmer & Sampford, supra note 3
(analyzing retrospectivity in Australian law).
191
Stamp Duty (Amendment) (No. 2) Bill 2010 Bills Committee, supra note 49, at 18. See
also Dr Margaret Ng’s speech in the LegCo debate: Official Reports of Proceedings,
Legislative Council), 12365, 12561-4, June 22, 2011) (H.K.) (criticizing the retrospective
aspects of the SSD).
192
Stamp Duty (Amendment) (No. 2) Bill 2010 Bills Committee, supra note 47.
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procedure to account for the handover in 1997.193 The former,
despite being deemed to have come into operation approximately
ten years earlier, is also relatively routine because it merely gave
effect to a legislative amendment of a different piece of legislation
(Companies Ordinance) from ten years earlier, which, due to a
drafting oversight, had not been correspondingly reflected in the
Societies Ordinance.194
The examples of the Societies Ordinance and the
Bankruptcy Ordinance were in addition to the prior list of existing
revenue ordinances that had retrospective effects.195 Essentially,
there were the amendments to the Inland Revenue Ordinance in
1987 and 1992. The 1987 amendment concerned the inclusion of
consideration in exchange for the right to receive income from
property as a taxable trading receipt, 196 but did not attract any
discussion of retrospectivity notwithstanding the three-month lapse
between the policy announcement and its eventual enactment.197
The 1992 amendment involved the closing of two tax-avoidance
mechanisms—namely, expenditures on intellectual property rights,
and leveraged leasing of ships and aircraft.198 It did give rise to a
discussion of retrospectivity, wherein the government agreed to
exempt “small ticket leasing” from retrospective application of the
law because the earlier announcement statement did not clearly spell
out its application to “small ticket leasing.”199
193

Id. See Bankruptcy Ordinance, c. 6 (1997) Cap. 6, §§ 1, 12, 19 & 32 (H.K.)
(demonstrating adaptive amendments to update the reference of government officials and
procedure to account for the handover in 1997).
194
The Companies Ordinance was amended to permitted large partnership to engage in
professional services such as lawyers and accountants, but without the corresponding
amendment to the Societies Ordinance, those would be still illegal: Official Record of
Proceedings, Legislative Council of Hong Kong, 1753, 1783-5 (July 6, 1988) (H.K.). See
also Official Record of Proceedings, Legislative Council of Hong Kong, 1931, 1982-3
(July 20, 1988) (H.K.) (discussing the implication of how the “legalization,” while
retrospectively applied to ten years ago, did not affect litigation that has already
commenced).
195
Stamp Duty (Amendment) (No. 2) Bill 2010 Bills Committee, supra note 48, at 2.
196
Inland Revenue Ordinance, (2012) Cap. 112, §15A (2012) (HK).
197
Official Record of Proceedings, Legislative Council, 1659, 1675-6. (May. 27, 1987)
(H.K.).
198
Inland Revenue Ordinance, §16E, 22B & 39E, supra note 196.
199
Official Record of Proceedings, Legislative Council, (Mar. 11, 1992) (H.K.)
(considering the easing of planes and ships “big ticket leasing”, while noting “small ticket
leasing” typically involves machineries and equipment that are of considerably less
monetary value).
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Interestingly, a more extensive list was provided in the
course of the debate about the retrospective nature of the Family
Status Discrimination (Amendment) Bill in 2000, in which the
amendment designed to clarify the original legislative intent (i.e.,
that the selective offering of benefits to immediate family members
of employees is not illegal, contrary to some legal opinions) was
made to be retrospective to the date of the original legislation,
though without affecting existing litigation.200 In addition to the
Societies Ordinance amendment in 1988 and the Inland Revenue
Ordinance amendment in 1992, the list also included the
Immigration Ordinance amendment in 1991, the Land Tribunal
Ordinance amendment in 1995 and the Employees’ Compensation
Ordinance amendment in 2000.201
The Lands Tribunal Ordinance amendment resembles the
Family Status (Discrimination) Ordinance insofar as the amendment
was made to clarify a clause—here being the jurisdiction of the
Lands Tribunal over orders for vacant possession on termination of
tenancies—and passed without any concern about its retrospective
application. 202 Similarly, the new provision § 13D(5) in the
Immigration Ordinance amendment was made to remove any doubt
as to the legal authority of the Director of Immigration to transfer
Vietnamese detainees between detention centers, though without
affecting legal proceedings that had already begun.203
The Employees’ Compensation Ordinance is uncontroversial.
Resembling the drafting oversight that drove the amendment to the
Societies Ordinance in 1988, the definition of “gale warning” and
200

Official Record of Proceedings, Legislative Council, 7550-3, (June 14, 2010) (H.K.).
See generally Family Status Discrimination Ordinance, (2013) Cap. 527 (H.K.) (making
discrimination on the basis of family status unlawful).
201
C M Wong, Family Status Discrimination (Amendment) Bill 2000, May 16, 2000, LC
Paper No: CB(2) 2015/99-00(01).
202
Official Record of Proceedings, Legislative Council of Hong Kong, (Nov. 29, 1995)
(H.K.); Official Record of Proceedings, Legislative Council, (Nov. 2, 1995) (H.K.) (noting
the amendment was meant to reverse a 1993 Court of Appeal decision). See Lands
Tribunal Ordinance, (1997) Cap. 17 §8(8) (H.K.) (outlining the powers of the Lands
Tribunal to issue orders after a tenancy is terminated).
203
There was no objection based on the retrospective effect: Official Record of
Proceedings, Legislative Council, (May 29, 1991) (H.K.). See Immigration Ordinance,
(1997) Cap. 115, §13D(5) (H.K.) (“For the avoidance of doubt, it is hereby declared that
any person detained under subsection (1) in any place may, under the authority of the
Director of Immigration, be transferred from that place and detained in any other place or
places specified by the Director of Immigration.”).
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“rainstorm warning” under section 5(4)(f) was restored to its
original meaning (to include red warning) in line with the previous
definition, which was based on another statute that had been
inadvertently altered when the latter, referencing the statute, was
amended for a different policy consideration.204
C. Taxing Power
As is typical with the constitutional structure of other
nations,205 Article 73 of the Basic Law provides that the power to
“approve taxation” and “enact, amend or repeal laws” is vested in
the legislative branch (i.e., the Legislative Council),206 though laws
relating to government policies are primarily introduced by the
executive branch. 207 Prior written approval of the Chief
Executive208 is required before members of the Legislative Council
can introduce such bills.209
The vesting of the taxing powers and general legislative
powers in the legislative branch means that the executive branch did
not have any legal basis to collect the tax before the amendments
were actually passed. Indeed, this is what happened in practice. As
explained by the Secretary for Transport and Housing in the first
reading of the 2010 amendment implementing the SSD:
Before the new law comes into effect, the Inland Revenue
Department (IRD) will record the residential property transactions
204

The referencing statue, the Judicial Proceedings (Adjournment During Gale Warnings)
Ordinance (c. 62), was amended to minimize disruption to the judicial process without
intending to affect general employment. The amendment of Employee’s Compensation
Ordinance was retrospectively made effective on the date the referencing statue was
amended. Official Record of Proceedings, Legislative Council, 5623, 5749-50, (Apr. 5,
2000) (H.K.); Official Reports of Proceedings, Legislative Council, 3899-900, (Feb. 16,
2010) (H.K.).
205
See BRADLEY & EWING, supra note 172, at 347-8 (discussing the authority for taxation
in the U.K.); GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 280-3 (5th ed. 2005)
(discussing the extent of U.S. Congress’s taxing power); Jaconelli, supra note 8, at 738
(observing the legal and political foundation of the doctrine).
206
See Cullen et al., supra note 87, at 326-8 (discussing the Legislative Council role in
budget and fiscal control).
207
XIANGGANG JIBEN FA art. 62 (H.K.).
208
Under Hong Kong current political institution arrangement, the Chief Executive is the
head of government, akin to the Governor of Hong Kong under British colonial rule. See
Benny Tai, The Chief Executive, in LAW OF THE HONG KONG CONSTITUTION 181 (Johannes
Chan & C.L. Lim eds., 2011) (discussing the appointment and powers of the Chief
Executive).
209
XIANGGANG JIBEN FA art. 74 (H.K.).
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between 20 November 2010 and the date of coming into effect of
the new law to identify the cases liable for SSD. Demand notes on
SSD will then be issued after the new legislation is enacted. And
during this period, the IRD will continue to allow and approve
applications for deferring stamp duty payment on agreements made
in accordance with the prevailing legislation, until the new law
comes into effect.” 210 A similar arrangement was provided for the
BSD.211
Interestingly, members of the executive branch publicly
acknowledged the role of the legislature in authorizing such
statutory measures,212 even if there was a certain irony when the
Financial Secretary observed that “[g]iven the effectiveness of the
Special Stamp Duty, I hope Members will pass the Bill as soon as
possible so that the Government can proceed with the initiative.”213
There is a little cognitive dissonance in discussing the demonstrated
effectiveness of a measure that is supposedly yet to be enacted.
D. Summary: Legislation by Press Release is Legal
In summary, the use of legislation by press release to
implement the BSD and other property cooling taxations is legal in
Hong Kong. The constitutional prohibition against retrospective
laws is only limited to criminal sanctions, and the provision of a
detailed announcement would have survived an expansive
interpretation of both the legality and proportionality principles. As
evidenced by the numerous past examples of retrospective laws,
including a couple of cases of legislation by press release, there is
no legal prohibition of retrospective non-criminal laws in general,
and legislation by press release in particular. The postponing of the
tax collection until legislative enactment, while maintaining a record
210

Official Record of Proceedings, Legislative Council, 3319, 3442-3, (Dec. 8, 2010)
(H.K.).
211
Transport and Housing Bureau, supra note 100 (“IRD will record all the residential
property transactions between 27 October 2012 and the date on which the new law comes
into effect, and demand notes for the SSD underpaid / BSD will be issued after the new
legislation is enacted.”).
212
E.g., Official Record of Proceedings, Legislative Council, 3319, 3442-3 (Dec. 8, 2010)
(H.K.) (quoting the Secretary for Transport and Housing, “I look forward to the early
passage of the Bill by the Council to give legal effect to these stamp duty related
proposals”).
213
Official Record of Proceedings, Legislative Council, 9037, 9158 (Apr. 13, 2011) (H.K.)
(emphasis added).
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of taxable transactions in the meantime, also navigates around the
formal legislative requirements for tax implementation. Thus,
notwithstanding
the
murmurs
about
the
issue
of
“constitutionality,”214 the practice is legal not only in Hong Kong,
but also in most other jurisdictions that do not have an explicit
prohibition on retrospective civil legislation.
In this regard, it is pertinent to observe that the political
controversy over the inclusion of the empowering provision to allow
the Financial Secretary to make immediate legal changes to the rates
of the BSD and SSD215 is ultimately a red herring. Without the
benefit of the empowering section in the Bill or any other laws, the
initial October 2012 announcement was a mere government policy
announcement that did not have any formal legal effect. However,
this lack of formal legal effect posed no obstacle to the
announcement’s real and direct effects on the property market. The
announced retrospectivity of the pending legal changes was more
than sufficient to achieve immediate de facto legal effects.
Concerns about “administrative tyranny” would have to be
addressed through reforming the legal status of retrospective laws
rather than the mere fixation of a particular empowering provision.

V. TOWARDS BETTER LEGISLATION BY PRESS RELEASE
Although the practice of legislation by press release is
generally legal in most jurisdictions, the normative considerations of
the practice are more nuanced. As discussed above in Part II.C.,
there are important merits and shortcomings associated with the
practice. This Part identifies and examines the three criteria that are
instrumental in assessing whether the use of legislation by press
release in a particular circumstance is normatively justified.
A. Certainty and Consistency with an Initial Announcement
Given that legislation by press release is designed to mitigate
the otherwise unjust disruption of individuals’ reliance on the law
arising from the retrospectivity of the law, it is relatively obvious
214
215

Law Society of Hong Kong, supra note 155 and accompanying text.
See supra III.C.
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that an example of well-executed legislation by press release would
require that its initial announcement set out the pending law with
sufficient clarity and that any substantial deviations in the eventual
legislation should not be retrospectively applied. In the same way
that clarity would be a desirable trait of any enacted legislation,216
clarity of the initial announcement is crucial in light of the
announcement’s substantial and intended effect to guide the conduct
of private entities.
In terms of changes, the legislative process through which
the final legislation is enacted inevitably would introduce some
differences vis-à-vis the initial announcement. Some differences
may be relatively inconsequential amendments to the wording,
while others may be substantive departures. The former is
uncontroversial, but material inconsistencies negate the advantages
of legislation by press release and reintroduce the harm of
conventional retrospective laws. Private individuals who conducted
their affairs in accordance with the rules set forth in the initial
announcement prior to passage of the final legislation would be
caught off-guard by those subsequent changes as with any
conventional retrospective laws. Of course, substantive departures
from the initial announcement are not per se undesirable. Indeed,
such changes are typically the result of deliberation during the
legislative process and reflect legislative scrutiny of important
policies under a healthy democratic process. The point is simply
that those changes not envisaged by the initial announcement should
only be prospectively applied.
In this regard, it is unfortunate that the withdrawal of the
exemption for Hong Kong Permanent Resident minors was
retrospectively applied until October 2012.217 Until the government
publicly announced its change of heart in January 2014, all public
representations from the government had continuously and
216

Justin F. Marceau, Lifting the Haze of Baze: Lethal Injection, the Eighth Amendment,
and Plurality Opinions, 41 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 159, 162-4 (2009) (discussing the undesirable
ambiguity arising from discerning the appropriate legal precedent from plurality court
decisions and circuit splits). See, e.g., Ji Lian Yap, Constructive Notice and Company
Charges, 10 J. CORPORATE L. STUD. 265, 274-7 (2010) (discussing the considerations of
certainty of both the statutory provision of the charges registration regime and the
consequential information available to third parties.
217
See supra III.C.
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specifically provided for this exemption.218 Unlike the other two
changes, which expanded the circumstances in which the BSD
would be exempted/refunded, this withdrawal was clearly and
substantially detrimental to the affected private entities. It is easy to
sympathize with the unpleasant shock to buyers who designed their
property purchase in reliance on this express exemption during the
period between October 2012 and January 2014 only to face a hefty
15% tax with the passage of the law.219 To aggravate the injury, the
government’s insistence on retrospectively applying this withdrawal
of exemption can be contrasted with the decision of the government
in 1992 not to retrospectively apply a similar withdrawal of tax
exemption for “small ticket leasing” given the ambiguity of the
initial announcement.220 This withdrawal will pose an interesting
legal issue with respect to the expanded notion of “law” and the
proportionality principle if litigated in Hong Kong,221 but such a
withdrawal is clearly undesirable from a normative perspective in
any event.
B. The Necessity(?) of Legislation by Press Release
Beyond certainty and consistency, the next criterion for
evaluation focuses on whether the use of legislation by press release
is actually necessary. This criterion is independent of whether the
substantive aspects of the laws are desirable. Rather, the inquiry
proceeds on the assumption that the underlying policy objective is
sound and focuses on whether the short-circuiting of the legislative
process under legislation by press release is necessary to achieve the
policy objective. In this regard, it is worth examining possible

218

As with the other taxes, the Inland Revenue Department posted a detailed FAQ setting
out the specifics of the BSD. To question 7 “Whether an agreement for sale signed by a
non-HKPR to acquire a residential property and hold it as a trustee for a HKPR is subject
to BSD?”, the response was “An agreement for sale signed by a non-HKPR in the capacity
of a trustee on behalf of a HKPR is chargeable with BSD, unless the HKPR is a minor or a
mentally incapacitated person.” A qualification was only added to this question, without
modifying the initial response, in January 2014, see Buyers Stamp Duty,
http://www.ird.gov.hk/eng/faq/bsd.htm (last updated Aug. 8, 2004) (“The Administration
has accepted the views of the members of Bills Committee of the Legislative Council and
decided to withdraw the proposed BSD exemption for HKPR minors.”).
219
Zhang Weiwei, Wei chengnian zhiye zhe huobei zhuisu jiaoshui [Minor Property
Purchasers May Faced Retrospective Tax Bill], SINGTAO DAILY (HK), Feb. 22, 2014, at A4.
220
See supra IV.B.4.
221
See supra IV.B.2. No litigation has been publicly announced thus far.
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justifications for conventional retrospective legislation that might
also be applicable to legislation by press release.
1. Changing Nature: Beyond Curative Legislation
Notwithstanding the negative image commonly associated
with retrospective laws, there are circumstances in which
retrospectivity is justified and desirable. The most common and
least controversial form of retrospective laws is “curative
legislation,” which can be further classified into the different subcategories: “routine revision,” “restorative legislation,” “validating
legislation” and “overturning judicial decisions.”222 The majority of
the Hong Kong examples of retrospective laws discussed in IV.B.4
fit into one of these sub-categories and provide useful contrasts to
the retrospectivity involved in implementing the BSD.
Routine revisions are retrospective amendments to relatively
minor errors, such as typographical errors or unforeseen changes
caused by amendments to other legislation. 223 The 1988
amendment to the Societies Ordinance, the 2000 amendment to the
Employee’s Compensation Ordinance amendment in 2000 and the
2005 amendment to the Bankruptcy Ordinance would fall under this
category.
Validating legislation addresses more substantive drafting
defects in legislation and is usually intended to “validate” erroneous
interpretations of the law by the government or private entities.224
Examples include the 1991 amendment to the Immigration
Ordinance that was meant to retrospectively ensure the legality of
the transfer of Vietnamese detainees by the Immigration
Department and the 2000 amendment to the Family Status
Discrimination Ordinance that shielded employers from possible
contraventions of the law.
Overturning judicial decisions is self-explanatory and is
represented by the 1995 amendment to the Lands Tribunal
Ordinance, which explicitly stated its intent to reverse a 1993 Court
222

SAMPFORD, supra note 2, at 104-18.
Id. at 104-5; Palmer & Sampford, supra note 3, at 237-8.
224
SAMPFORD, supra note 2, at 107-15; Palmer & Sampford, supra note 3, at 239-45.
223
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of Appeal decision.225 Restorative legislation addresses legislative
schemes that have unintentionally been allowed to lapse.226 None of
the Hong Kong examples falls into this last category, possibly due
to the uncommon use of a “sunset” clause in Hong Kong.227
The focus of this Article, legislation by press release, has
been previously employed a couple of times in Hong Kong to tackle
tax avoidance. The 1987 and 1992 amendments to the Inland
Revenue Ordinance were both designed to close tax loopholes and
were both backdated to the date of announcement. 228 This
experience echoes that of Australia, where the most frequent use of
legislation by press release was to combat the then-rampant tax
avoidance industry.229 The fact that these examples of legislation by
press release are designed to tackle tax avoidance is significant
insofar as they could be classified under the conventional curative
legislation category—in particular, the sub-category of validating
legislation. An argument could be made that certain tax loopholes
are never intended by the legislature in the first place and that
retrospective amendment is simply intended to restore the original
legislative purpose. In a 2013 case involving retrospective tax, the
European Court of Human Rights, in assessing the principle of
legality, observed that “retroactive taxation can be applicable
essentially to remedy technical deficiencies of the law.” 230
Moreover, because the expectations by tax avoiders are really
neither rational nor legitimate, the retrospective closing of loopholes
is arguably justified even if the backdating extends beyond the date
of the legislative announcement.231

225

Official Reports of Proceedings, Legislative Council, (Nov. 29, 1995) (H.K.); Official
Reports of Proceedings Legislative Council, (Nov. 2, 1995), (H.K).
226
SAMPFORD, supra note 2, at 105-7; Palmer & Sampford, supra note 3, at 239.
227
Transport and Housing Bureau, The Government’s Response to the Draft Committee
Stage Amendments Proposed by the Hon Tommy CHEUNG Yu-yan, 2013 CB(1) 594/1314(01), (Dec., 2013) (the Government was repeatedly adamant against any sunset clause
for the BSD and the SSD). For the earlier rejection of sunset clause for the SSD in 2011,
see Legislative Council Secretariat, Bills Committee on Stamp Duty (Amendment) (No. 2)
Bill 2010, CB(1) 2444/10-11, (June 16, 2011). Official Reports of Proceedings,
Legislative Council, 12564 (June 22, 2011) (H.K.) (sunset clause was also rejected for the
Interception of Communication and Surveillance Bill).
228
See supra Part IV.B.4.
229
SAMPFORD, supra note 2, at 157; Palmer & Sampford, supra note 3, at 263.
230
R. Sz., supra note 181, at ¶ 40.
231
SAMPFORD, supra note 2, at 147-51, 245-6; Palmer & Sampford, supra note 3, at 257-9.
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By contrast, the BSD represents a significant departure. The
BSD is an entirely novel form of taxation that has no equivalent in
the existing tax law of Hong Kong, which generally does not
impose different transaction taxes based on the identity of the
parties. 232 Thus, there could be no arguments about these
retrospective amendments being curative in nature. In addition, the
BSD, while a form of tax, is not enacted for the purpose of revenue
but for the specific goal of curbing the perceived overheated
property market.233 This, again, can be contrasted with the more
typical anti-avoidance type of legislation by press release in taxation,
whether in Hong Kong or in Australia. Indeed, although legislation
by press release is by no means limited to tax avoidance and has in
fact been employed on substantive regulatory matters in other
jurisdictions,234 the BSD appears to be part of an emerging practice
by the Hong Kong government to utilize legislation by press release
for economic regulation. Beginning with the SSD in 2010 and
continuing until the 2013 implementation of another propertycooling tax (the Double Stamp Duty [DSD]),235 all three taxes have
been driven by non-revenue policy objectives. Indeed, this departure
is even more significant given that, although taxation is an
important instrument commonly used by other jurisdictions to effect
important social and economic policies,236 taxation has previously
occupied a much smaller policy footprint in Hong Kong.237
232

See Stamp Duty Ordinance, supra note 91, § 41-4 (finding exemptions to the stamp
duty are sometime provided for the usual suspects of government, foreign diplomatic
institutions and charitable organizations). See generally DELOITTE, HONG KONG MASTER
TAX GUIDE 817-84 (12th ed., 2011) (discussing Hong Kong’s transaction tax regime,
including exemptions).
233
Transport and Housing Bureau, supra note 100, at 1.
234
Recent examples include the prohibition of severance of common land rights in the U.K.
and the change in foreign takeovers regulation in Australia. SAMPFORD, supra note 2, at
157; Palmer & Sampford, supra note 3, at 262-4.
235
As a further measure to curb property speculation, the DSD doubled the stamp duties
for all property transactions, with an exception for except first-time local buyers, was
introduced in February 23, 2013 with legislation by press release. See Olga Wong et al.,
New stamp duties trigger last minute push for flat sales, S. Duties Trigger Scramble for
Sales, S. CHINA MORNING POST, (Feb. 23, 2013), http://www.scmp.com/news/hongkong/article/1156620/new-stamp-duties-trigger-rush-flat-sales; Extra stamp duty, ‘to hit
speculators only’, says financial secretary Tsang, S.Hit Speculators Only”, S. CHINA
MORNING
POST,
(Feb.
25,
2013),
http://www.scmp.com/news/hongkong/article/1157816/extra-stamp-duty-hit-speculators-only-says-financial-secretarytsang?page=all.
236
Gribnau, supra note 31, at 53.
237
See Cullen et al., supra note 87, at 331-9 (discussing the low rate, narrow base, and
straightforward tax regime in Hong Kong).
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2. Justification: Risk of Circumvention?
Without the ability to resort to a justification based on the
curative nature of the retrospective amendments, the justification for
backdating the legislation to the date of announcement must rest on
preventing circumvention by private entities. Given that the
legislative process inevitably takes time, even for non-controversial
matters, failure to retrospectively apply the new law to the date of
announcement would likely result in a surge of activities that the
new law sought to prevent.238 Moreover, whereas the legislation by
press release is designed to tackle tax avoidance, the initial
announcement would ironically serve as a public notification of the
existence and legality of these tax loopholes if the announcement
were not accompanied by intent of retrospective application.239
The risk of circumvention that would severely undermine
legislative purposes is particularly acute when the activities
involved are durable (i.e., the activities will implicate a relatively
long-term time horizon). The purchase of real property—the
subject matter of the BSD—is the classic example. The purchase of
real property by most private entities is usually a substantial
investment that is likely to forestall future purchases over an
extended period, typically measured in terms of years or even
decades. Without legislation by press release, it is entirely possible
and foreseeable that there would be an incredible surge of property
purchases in the several months between the date of announcement
and the eventual enactment240 that would be likely to exhaust the
demand (and supply) for the property for the subsequent year or
years. Similar analysis also applies to vehicles—restrictions on
vehicle ownership in a bid to reduce traffic congestion must be
implemented immediately from the policy announcement to prevent
a mere shifting of the future demand for vehicles into the interval
between the policy announcement and legislative enactment.241
238

SAMPFORD, supra note 2, at 157; Fisch, supra note 3, at 1089; Palmer & Sampford,
supra note 3, at 264. See also Jaconelli, supra note 8, at 738-40 (discussing the problem of
“forestalling” by private entities in response to knowledge of the pending tax).
239
SAMPFORD, supra note 2, at 157; Palmer & Sampford, supra note 3, at 263-4.
240
The initial SSD took a whole of eight months to pass. Official Reports of Proceedings,
Legislative Council, 12660-61 (June 22, 2010) (H.K.).
241
The recent implementation of a vehicle quota in the Chinese city of Guangzhou were
preceded by an announcement the evening before implementation, though the ability to
“streamline” the legislative and regulatory process under Chinese less-than-democratic
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Nonetheless, it is important to appreciate the nuances of the
risk of circumstances posed by the different policy objectives
because the mere fact that transactions are shifted into the period
between the policy announcement and eventual enactment does not
always defeat the legislative purpose. When the objective is the
raising of revenue (such as closing tax avoidance loopholes) or the
curbing of a particular activity (such as restricting vehicle
ownership), the legislative objectives are thwarted because the lack
of retrospective application would mean that the shifting would
reduce the revenue collected (for the former) or fail to reduce the
level of activity (for the later).242
The circumstances are more complicated for the BSD,
whose primary goal is not revenue raising243 but the twin economic
regulatory goals of cooling the property market and reducing
demand from foreign property purchasers.244 Without retrospective
application of the BSD, the common prediction is that there would
be a rush of foreign speculators purchasing property before the
BSD’s implementation,245 resulting in an increase in demand for
property that is likely to inflate prices further prior to the BSD’s
institutional framework meant that this immediate implementation can be achieved via
prospective regulations rather than legislation by press release. Zhou An, Guangzhou:
“yaohao + paipai” nengfou cheng zhidu liangfang [Guangzhou: Can “Lottery + Auction”
be Ideal Solution for Congestion?], RENMIN GONGAN BAO – JIATONG ANQUAN ZHOUKAN,
July 17, 2012, at 4. For a comparative discussion of these traffic congestion management
policies, see generally Jianlin Chen & Jiongzhe Cui, More Market-Oriented Than U.S. And
More Socialist Than China: A Comparative Public Property Story of Singapore, Vol. 23, 1
PAC. RIM L. & POL’Y J. 1 (2014).
242
See also Jonathan Remy Nash, Allocation and Uncertainty: Strategic Responses to
Environmental Grandfathering, 36 ECOLOGY L.Q. 809, 825-6 (2009) (discussing the
danger of the preemptive clearing of ecologically valuable habitat by private land owners
between the proposal of relevant environmental preservation regulation and
implementation of the regulation, which typically do not include retrospective effect).
243
Transport and Housing Bureau, supra note 100, Annex F (“The proposed adjustments to
the existing SSD and the introduction of the BSD are not intended to be revenuegenerating measures to meet fiscal or budgetary objectives, although they are expected to
bring about additional revenue to the Government.”).
244
Transport and Housing Bureau, supra note 100.
245
There was a rush by foreign buyers to purchase property during the short interval
between the policy announcement and actual implementation. See supra Part: supra III.B.
Previously, this issue of circumvention has served as the common justification for
legislation by press release. See Paper for the House Committee Meeting on 10 June 2011:
Bills Committee on Stamp Duty (Amendment) (No. 2) Bill 2010, CB(1) 2399/10-11, at 3
(2011) (concerning the (implementation of the SSD in 2011); see also Official Record of
Proceedings, Legislative Council, *1, *44 (Nov. 27, 1991) (H.K.) (concerning the 1992
amendment of the Inland Revenue Ordinance).
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actual implementation. However, if property prices in Hong Kong
are indeed driven up by speculators, then the mere notice that the
BSD will become applicable sometime in the foreseeable future is
likely to dampen the demand immediately because speculators
(including foreign speculators) will not be keen on investing too
much in a property that is likely to face increased impediments (i.e.,
reduced demand by foreigners) in the foreseeable future. 246
Similarly, demand by entities exempted from the BSD (i.e., Hong
Kong permanent residents) is likely to be shifted to the period after
the BSD’s implementation on the expectation of price decreases at
that time, further diluting the demand during the transitional period.
These factors are likely to create a downward pressure on price,
allowing the government to achieve some “cooling” of the property
market and discouragement of foreign property purchasers by the
mere announcement of the legislature’s plan to impose the BSD.
However, other characteristics of the Hong Kong property
market do increase the risk of thwarting the legislative objective.
First, companies are subjected to the BSD, but unlike the purchase
of property by foreign natural persons, the subsequent transfer of the
shares of the one-property company (i.e., a commonly used
corporate structure in Hong Kong in which a company is set with
the sole purpose of holding a property) would not be subjected to
the BSD or any real estate transaction stamp duty.247 Thus, both
foreign and local speculators can purchase a property using a
company vehicle before the implementation of the BSD with
knowledge that the future transfer of the property would not be
subjected to any BSD regardless of the identity of the future
purchasers. This speculative activity is only partially hindered by
the transaction costs involved in the use of company structure and
the reluctance of some purchasers concerned with not having direct
ownership over the property. 248
246

NICHOLAS G. PIROUNAKIS, REAL ESTATE ECONOMICS: A POINT-TO-POINT HANDBOOK
211-5 (2013); Hong Kong’ own experience evidenced this trite point. The property and
stock market crashes in the earlier 1980s were founded simply on the possible
consequences of China’s exercise of sovereignty over Hong Kong in 1997. Chan, supra
note 80, at 16-7. For a discussion of the sources of risks, including legal and taxation risks,
and their impact on current property value, see DAVID ISAAC & JOHN O’LEARY, PROPERTY
VALUATION TECHNIQUES 172-8 (3d ed. 2013).
247
Ng & Li, supra note 146, at 3.
248
Id. Interestingly, the fact that these negative factors are disproportionately more onerous
for residential property of a lower value actually meant that they further negate the risks of
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Second, given the inevitably time-consuming process of property
development and the issue of land scarcity in Hong Kong, the
shifting of property purchase forward into the transitional period
may adversely disrupt supply in the foreseeable future. Insofar as
there might be a greater proportion of foreign buyers within the
transitional period, there would be a lower supply of property for
local buyers after the BSD is finally implemented. Indeed, this
situation is likely to be aggravated by developers pushing forward
the launch of new property in response to the pending
implementation of the BSD.249 As noted above, developers in Hong
Kong are able to push forward the property launch by a day with
only a few hours’ notice.250
3. The Proper Focus of Inquiry
The various aforementioned factors point in different and
often opposing directions. On balance, legislation by press release
is most likely necessary to achieve the purported policy objectives
in the particular context of Hong Kong. Yet, the key takeaway is
that this conclusion of necessity is not as straightforward as most
assume. Indeed, it is telling that the government’s explanatory
document on the BSD presented to the legislature in October 2012
did not even attempt to justify the use of legislation by press release
in the section concerning implementation,251 with only a cursory
mention of “[g]iven the price-sensitive nature of the property market,
the proposed new measures shall take effect from the day
immediately following the announcement” in the final report of the
amendment bill. 252 Notwithstanding the necessity being more
obvious in the most commonly used context of tax avoidance,
retrospective applications are not always necessary in other policy
contexts. Moreover, even when revenue generation is the primary
circumventing legislative objectives, in so far as the main policy consideration is to make
housing affordable to the lower-middle class in Hong Kong.
249
See TIM HAVARD, FINANCIAL FEASIBILITY STUDIES FOR PROPERTY DEVELOPMENT:
THEORY AND PRACTICE 26-30 (2014) (discussing the various constraints that developers
consider when planning for a development project, including market timing, political
environment and planning rules); PIROUNAKIS, supra note 246, at 215-26 (discussing the
calculus of the developer).
250
See supra Part III.B.
251
Transport and Housing Bureau, supra note 100 (PIN?).
252
Report of the Bills Committee on Stamp Duty (Amendment) Bill 2012, CB(1) 904/13-14,
3 (Feb. 18, 2014).
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policy goal, Joseph Jaconelli observed that there may be
circumstances in which shifting forward the targeted tax activities
might produce sufficient beneficial side benefits (e.g., a short-term
stimulus to the economy) that could mitigate the loss in revenue.253
Charles Sampford, in his earlier 1993 article with Andrew
Palmer, made a similar point, albeit only in passing, when
discussing the 1987 enactment of the Broadcasting (Ownership and
Control) Act as an illustrative example of how Parliament was
compelled to enact retrospective legislation for which the presiding
policy announcement had been relied on by private entities.254 In
that scenario, a flurry of transactions of media ownership had taken
place in response to and in reliance on the Australian government’s
announcement to modify ownership restrictions on broadcasters.255
In addition to noting the harm of undermining the parliament, they
correctly observed that the undermining of the parliament was
aggravated by the fact that “there was no good reason why the
Government had to make the changes effective from the date of
announcement. Delaying the introduction of the new rule until it
was enacted would simply have delayed the firing of the startinggun for the mad media scramble from the date of the announcement
to the date of enactment.”256 Indeed, they further articulated that the
retrospectivity in legislation by press release
“[S]hould be restricted to situations where there is a genuine
need for immediate action, or where the making of an
announcement that the law is to be changed would, unless coupled
with a promise to make the change effective from the date of

253

Jaconelli, supra note 8, at 739. Cf. Emanuela Carbonara et al., Unjust Laws and Illegal
Norms, 32 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 285, 295 (2012) (discussing how the immediate effect of
legal changes may be useful in reducing social opposition to unpopular laws).
254
Palmer & Sampford, supra note 3, at 265-6.
255
Id. The modification changed a prohibition in any person owning more than 5% in more
than two television broadcasting companies to a prohibition targeted cross-media
ownership and prohibiting media owners from having combined access to 60% or more of
the national population through the regulated medium of television, radio, and daily
newspapers. For a discussion on the background context for the legal change, see Jock
Given, Cross-Media Ownership Laws: Refinement or Rejection?, 30(1) U.N.S.W. L.J. 258,
259-61 (2007); David J. Brennan, Printing in England and Broadcasting in Australia: A
Comparative Study of Regulatory Impulse, 22 ADEL. L. REV. 63, 79-80 (2000).
256
Palmer & Sampford, supra note 3, at 266.

2014]

HONG KONG LEGISLATION BY PRESS RELEASE

51

announcement, allow citizens to gain some unwarranted advantage
from their foreknowledge of the change.”257
These valid points were subsequently and surprisingly
omitted by Charles Sampford in his more comprehensive (and much
lengthier) book covering essentially the same ground, including the
use of the exact same example when discussing the illustrative
example of legislation by press release undermining parliament.258
This omission is unfortunate because whether retrospectivity is
necessary in relation to the policy goals is clearly relevant for
assessing the use of legislation by press release.
Moreover, although considerations about the “genuine need
for immediate action” and “some unwarranted advantage from their
foreknowledge of the [legal] change” 259 are aimed in the right
direction, they all stem from the fundamental issue of whether
shifting forward the activities targeted by the legal change would
derail the legislative objectives. As illustrated by the case study of
the BSD, these considerations would first entail identifying what the
purported legislative objectives are, followed by examining the
incentives created by the policy announcement for private entities,
to predict and assess whether the responses to the announcement
would undermine the legislative objectives if the legal change is not
to have retrospective effects until the announcement.
C. Implications of Political Dynamic
The case study of the BSD also reveals an interesting nuance
to the harm arising from the use of legislation by press release,
namely, how the political dynamic of a jurisdiction can either
aggravate or mitigate these harms, whether it be undermining the
legislature, inherent uncertainty, or excessive delay.260
1. Implications of Political Dynamic
The political dynamic of a jurisdiction is the product of the
interplay between the formal constitutional structure and political
257

Id., at 266.
See SAMPFORD, supra note 2, at 160-1.
259
Palmer & Sampford, supra note 3, at 266.
260
See supra Part II.C.
258
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competition on the ground. In terms of formal constitutional
structure, it is important to observe that the use of legislation by
press release in Australia and the U.K., the jurisdictions surveyed by
Charles Sampford in the relevant section of his book, 261 is not
particularly controversial given the institutional designs of these two
jurisdictions. The U.K. adopts a Westminster parliamentary system
in which the executive branch (consisting of the Prime Minister and
the Cabinet, which is appointed by the Prime Minister) is typically
of the same political party as that holding the majority of seats in the
legislature.262 The parliamentary system is similar in Australia,
where the political composition of the legislature (the House of
Representatives) and the executive (the Prime Minister and the
Cabinet) are often identical, though there is a slight complication
arising from an additional elected Senate that was originally
designed to safeguard states’ rights (through equal seats per state,
regardless of differences in population) and has some significant
veto power over legislation (especially when compared to the
U.K.’s House of Lords, which has a more advisory-oriented role).263
Similarly, in Sweden, where the prohibition on retroactive
taxation is subject to the exception of what is essentially legislation
by press release, the head of the executive is again selected by the
legislature.264 Given the intentional close proximity between the
legislature and the executive under the formal institutional
arrangements of these jurisdictions, the danger and harm of the
perceived executive’s usurping of legislative power via legislation
by press release are more illusory than real. Uncertainty and delay
in the legislative outcome are also likely to be less severe in such
circumstances. This situation is unlike the U.S.-style separation of
powers, where it is common for the executive and the legislature to
be of different political compositions and to be sometimes at severe
loggerheads with one another.265
261

SAMPFORD, supra note 2, at 156-64. Australia and the U.K. are also common law
jurisdictions discussed in the literature involving legislation by press release. See Hayes &
Wilson, supra note 8; Infobank, supra note 9.
262
BRADLEY & EWING, supra note 172, at 84-5; CARROLL, supra note 172, at 227-45;
PETER LEYLAND & GORDON ANTHONY, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 20-6 (7th ed. 2013).
263
KEYZER, supra note 54, at 10-3, 52-3; Stewart & Walker, supra note 8, at 194-5.
264
Bernard Michael Ortwein II, The Swedish Legal System: An Introduction, 13 IND. INT'L
& COMP. L. REV. 405, 407-11 (2003); Påhlsson, supra note 8, at 271-2.
265
CHARLES A. SHANOR, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: STRUCTURE AND
RECONSTRUCTION 119-56, 170-201 (4th ed. 2009).
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The political competition at any given time does shape the
relationship between the executive and the legislature and can
materially affect the power of the executive. For example, the
executive under a Westminster-style parliamentary system will
wield considerably less power (including the power to effect
legislation by press release) when the parliamentary majority of the
corresponding political party is weak or when there is internal
division within the majority party. 266 This situation can cause
considerable uncertainty and delay in the legislative process and
may result in the final legislation departing substantially from the
original announcement 267 or in the retrospective effect being
removed altogether.268 On the other hand, the actual dominance of
one political party in the elections is likely to transcend whatever
formal separation of powers exists and produce consistency between
the executive’s policy objectives and the legislature’s legislative
activities.269 In this latter scenario, especially if coupled with strong
party structure/discipline among the political parties, the use of
legislation by press release by the executive—even in a U.S.-style
separation of powers system—would only minimally undermine the
legislature and would be unlikely to cause uncertainty and delay.

266

See CARROLL, supra note 172, at 227-30, 235-9 (discussing the power of the executive
branch with reference to U.K. political dynamic).
267
For example, the final 60% population-reach rule under the 1987 enactment of
Australia’s Broadcasting (Ownership and Control) Act was a departure from the initially
announced 75%. Given, supra note 255, at 259-61; Brennan, supra note 255, at 79-80.
268
Palmer & Sampford, supra note 3, at 269. See also Påhlsson, supra note 8, at 274-5
(noting Swedish examples).
269
Levinson & Pildes, supra note 26, at 2315 (“We emphasize that the degree and kind of
competition between the legislature and executive branches vary significantly, and may all
but disappear, depending on whether the House, Senate, and presidency are divided or
unified by political party.”). See also Kammer, supra note 26, at 97-106 (discussing how
politically influential private parties, such as political parties and interest groups, can
transcend the formal division of power between state and federal government); Cornelia
Pillard, Unitariness and Myopia: The Executive Branch, Legal Process, and Torture, 81
IND. L.J. 1297, 1298-300 (2006) (“In the context of one-party dominance of the three
branches, however, the rights-protecting effect of separation of powers is reduced. That
effect is further diminished regarding matters of national security and war, which trigger
partially unreviewable power in the political branches. Following 9/11, with Republicans
dominating all three branches and war ongoing, risks of governmental myopia ran high.”).
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2. Hong Kong’s Fragmented and Antagonistic Political Landscape
This insight regarding the implications of the political
dynamic on the use of legislation by press release is particularly
relevant for Hong Kong, given the ongoing political transition of its
fledgling democracy under the “One country Two systems”
regime.270 Prior to the handover to China in 1997, Hong Kong was
essentially governed through the British colonial government, a
largely executive apparatus with only limited checks from the
partially elected legislature.271 This conspicuous formal lack of
separation of powers and any material political competition meant
that the use of legislation by press release, such as the 1987 and
1992 amendments to the Inland Revenue Ordinance,272 could not be
any less controversial or problematic.273
The situation has changed considerably since the time of the
handover. The legislature, Legislative Council (LegCo), is now
significantly more autonomous vis-à-vis the executive, with all
LegCo members now being elected.274 The Basic Law also codifies
the lawmaking and budget-approving powers of the legislature,275
together with the ability to override the veto of the Chief
Executive.276 The Chief Executive, the head of the Hong Kong
government, is also separately elected, 277 though the current
arrangement provides for a somewhat limited election by an
270

For a discussion of the “one country, two systems” policy, see C.L. Lim & Johannes
Chan, Autonomy and Central-Local Relations, in LAW OF THE HONG KONG CONSTITUTION
37 (Johannes Chan & C.L. Lim eds., 2011).
271
Bill K.P. Chou, Election Without Fair Representation: Hong Kong’s Legislative
Council and its Implications for Non-liberal Regimes, in PARLIAMENTS IN ASIA:
INSTITUTION BUILDING AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT 228, 229 (Zheng Yongnian et al. eds.,
2014). For a discussion of colonial era governance institutions in Hong Kong, see
NORMAN MINERS, THE GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS OF HONG KONG 68-82 (5th ed. 1991);
WESLEY-SMITH, supra note 160, at 154-68; Chen, supra note 115, at 217-28, 230.
272
See supra Part IV.B.2.4.
273
See MINERS, supra note 271, at 77-8 (discussing the rare instances where the Legislative
Council rejected or significantly altered the legislative bills put forward by Hong Kong’s
executive branch).
274
XIANGGANG JIBENN FA art. 68 (H.K.); Lam, supra note 115, at 138; Chen, supra note
115, at 230-1.
275
XIANGGANG JIBENN FA art. 73 (H.K.). See Chou, supra note 271, at 236.
276
XIANGGANG JIBENN FA art. 49-50 (H.K.). If the LegCo can produce a two third majority
after the initial veto, then the Chief Executive must either sign the bill or dissolve the
legislature. The Chief Executive can only dissolve the legislature once in each term of
office.
277
XIANGGANG JIBENN FA art. 45 (H.K).
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Election Committee that is not itself either directly elected by the
population or accountable in any way to the LegCo.278 Moreover,
the Chief Executive, upon successful election, must declare that he
or she is not a member of any political party,279 further diluting any
relationship with the dominant political party of the legislature.280
This formal separation of power is aggravated by the
increasingly intense and antagonistic political competition in Hong
Kong. The political participants in Hong Kong can be largely
divided into two camps based on their perception and advocacy on
the relationship with the Chinese central government.281 On the one
hand, the “pro-establishment” camp favors a closer relationship, or
at least the maintenance of the status quo in terms of China’s role in
Hong Kong’s economic and social life. The “pan-democrats,” on
the other hand, advocate greater autonomy for Hong Kong,
including a more liberal democratic institution that is distinct from
the Chinese government’s conceptualization of good governance.282
The “pan-democrats” have consistently garnered a solid majority of
the popular vote in elections by universal suffrage, but they occupy
only a minority in the LegCo due to the institutional design of the
LegCo—in particular, the use of functional constituencies in which
members are elected from a defined electorate, typically based on
278

Tai, supra note 208, at 187-94; SIMON N. M. YOUNG & RICHARD CULLEN, ELECTING
HONG KONG’S CHIEF EXECUTIVE 20-27 (2010); Tai, supra note 208, at 187-94.
279
Chief Executive Election Ordinance (2012) (HK). The eligibility requirement is set out
in sections 13 and 14 of the Chief Executive Election Ordinance, and the typical
requirements based on age, nationality/residency, mental capacity, and lack of criminal
record. See YOUNG & CULLEN, supra note 278, at 80-2 (providing an academic discussion
on eligibility to be Chief Executive).
280
Lam, supra note 115, at 141. Cf., Chou, supra note 271, at 236 (noting how the cooptation of certain leaders of the political party into “a system of consultative organs with
the Executive Council at the apex” allows the Chief Executive to “build up his ‘ruling
coalition’”).
281
Chen, supra note 115, at 242-44; Chou, supra note 271, at 229-30. See Joseph Y.S.
Cheng, Democratization in Hong Kong: A Theoretical Exception, in DEMOCRACY IN
EASTERN ASIA: ISSUES, PROBLEMS AND CHALLENGES IN A REGION OF DIVERSITY 224, 22930 (Edmund S.K. Fung & Steve Drakeley eds., 2014) (describing pro-Beijing and prodemocracy parties).
282
Chen, supra note 115, at 244-5; Lam, supra note 115, at 141-2; Ho-fung Hung & Iamchong Ip, Hong Kong’s Democratic Movement and the Making of China’s Offshore Civil
Society, 52 ASIAN SURVEY 504, 508-11 (2012); Zheng Yongnian & Tok Sow Keat, Beijing
Responds to Hong Kong’s Democratization Movement: From Bureaucratic Control to
Political Leadership, 33 ASIAN AFFAIRS 235, 244-5 (2007). See MINERS, supra note 271,
at 196-202 (detailing a historical perspective on the evolution of new political parties in
Hong Kong).
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profession or industry.283 To say that the two camps dislike each
other would be a massive understatement, with the “pan-democrats”
typically voting against government policies, 284 and attempted
compromise with the government by the more moderate faction of
the “pan-democrats” has typically been met with derision by other
“pan-democrats.285
There are two further complications that aggravate the
uncertainty in the legislative process. First, there is an underlying
fissure between politicians who are pro-grassroots and those who
are pro-business. 286
These differences have largely been
overshadowed by the more ideologically charged issue of China and
liberal democracy, but they remain a potential issue for major
economic policies that involve a substantial wealth-redistribution
element. 287 The second complication relates to the functional
constituencies in the LegCo. Given the narrowly defined electoral
base, it is unsurprising that these functional constituencies of
LegCo’s members are more concerned with appealing to their
constituents’ interests than the overall performance of the
government.288
With this combination of formal institutional design and
actual political competition, it is no surprise that the “Executive has
to conduct ‘government by perpetual intensive lobbying, horse283

Chen, supra note 115, at 243; Lam, supra note 115, at 141-2. Cf., Cheng, supra note
281, at 243 (observing that the popular support for pro-democracy groups is to further
“checks and balances against the soft authoritarianism of the HKSAR government” rather
than the notion of “pro-democracy movement would provide a credible alternative
government”, or even “a more effective and efficient administration.”). See Chou, supra
note 271, at 230-3.
284
Hung & Ip, supra note 282, at 513; Lam, supra note 115, at 145. See Cheng, supra note
281, at 241-2 (discussing the recent rise of radical political actions in Hong Kong).
285
Chen, supra note 115, at 241-2. See Yongnian & Keat, supra note 282, at 246-7
(discussing the culture war style labels employed during the 2004 public debate on
constitutional reforms).
286
Chen, supra note 115, at 244; Chou, supra note 271, at 231-2; Lam, supra note 115, at
138.
287
See, e.g., LEE, ET AL., supra note 88, at 74-5 (discussing the political dynamic over the
anti-poverty campaign); see, e.g., Chou, supra note 271, at 241 (discussing how the
enactment of the minimum wage represents a rare departure of the interest of the otherwise
dominant business class).
288
Chen, supra note 115, at 232-33; Lam, supra note 115, at 144-5. Chou, supra note 271,
at 230-1 (comparing the geographical districts that comprises of 3.37 million voters, the
functional constituencies that made up half the Legislative Council are voted by a mere
two hundred thousand odd voters.).
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trading and playing one political party or grouping off another’”289
and yet still face significant obstacles in obtaining LegCo approval
of controversial legislation and appropriations for major
infrastructure projects.290 All of these factors certainly help explain
the delay in the legislative approval of the BSD. The amendment
bill continued to languish at the legislative-approval stage more than
a year after the policy announcement. As examined above in Part
III.C, one major cause of the delay was a filibuster by the more
radical “pan-democrats” to derail general legislative activities.
Similarly, there was intense lobbying by the functional group of
legislators representing the real estate and construction sectors to—
not surprisingly—repeal or otherwise dilute the tax that negatively
impacts the attractiveness of Hong Kong real estate. Furthermore,
the pro-grassroots politicians were also busy working to appeal to
the populist sentiment against foreigners (in particular mainlanders)
by proposing amendments that further extended the reach of the
BSD. The controversy over the “oral undertaking” only highlights
the intense hostility among the political parties and the
consequential legislative uncertainty.
3. The Problematic Failed Legislation by Press Release
Such delay and uncertainty in securing legislative approval
to give retrospective effect to the legal measures previously
announced are certainly not conducive to providing information to
private entities who are desperately seeking guidance on the legal
consequences of their intended actions. Indeed, this uncertainty
negates the main advantage of legislation by press release—namely,
the retrospective effect would not unduly unravel the rational and
legitimate expectation of private entities in light of the advance
warning via the announcement. When private entities cannot rely
on the legislature adhering to or even effecting the change proposed
in the initial announcement, they are stuck in a quandary of either
proceeding on the basis of the proposed new law that may never
pass, or acting in accordance with the existing law but risk being
subjected to the proposed new law if it is ultimately passed. This
situation renders the reference to the previous use of legislation by
289

Chen, supra note 115, at 230.
Chen, supra note 115, at 230; Chou, supra note 271, at 241. See Lam, supra note 115,
at 142-4 (evaluating the performance of the Legislative Council through assessing stats on
voting behavior and legislation success rate).

290

58

U. OF PENNSYLVANIA EAST ASIA LAW REVIEW Vol. 10

press release by the current government291 ill-conceived because the
political dynamic has been dramatically altered.
Of course, the more interesting issue is the future use of
legislation by press release beyond the BSD. One likelihood is that
the use of legislation by press release will fade away in Hong Kong.
Frequent refusals of the legislature to advance the executive’s policy
objectives weaken the power and influence of the executive
branch.292 This dynamic aggravates efforts to use legislation by
press release because it directly undermines the executive’s
credibility.
Having encountered such difficulties over
implementation of the BSD (and also the SSD and DSD), the
executive will arguably be hesitant to utilize such measures in the
future. Indeed, it is not surprising that the U.S., given its formal
separation of powers and divided political scene, is conspicuously
absent in Charles Sampford’s survey of legislation by press
release. 293 Such a development is actually welcome because,
notwithstanding the controversy surrounding the use of legislation
by press release, poorly executed legislation by press release is
clearly undesirable and should be avoided.
However, there is another, more disturbing possibility. As
observed in Part IV.B.1, the BSD is a departure from previous uses
of legislation by press release in Hong Kong in that the policy
objective is economic regulation rather than the more typical
objectives of revenue generation or tax avoidance. Moreover, the
case study of the BSD demonstrates how the initial announcement,
despite any legal authorization, has already produced a dramatic
impact on people’s behavior that is consistent with the policy
objective of cooling the property market and reducing demand by
foreign buyers. Thus, even if the BSD had been ultimately rejected
by the LegCo, the executive has successfully managed to achieve its

291

See, e.g., LC Paper No. CB(1) 2399/10-11, supra note 245 (discussing the 1987 and
1992 amendments to the Inland Revenue Ordinance, which were passed with retrospective
effect).
292
Chou, supra note 271 (“Whether Legco passes its bills, is of major concern to the
government. The defeat of important bills may be regarded as a no-confidence vote on the
government.”).
293
SAMPFORD, supra note 2, at 156-64. In contrast, numerous U.S. examples are discussed
with respect to retrospective criminal law and retrospective taxation laws, see SAMPFORD,
supra note 2, at 132-41 & 154-6.
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policy objective, at least for the considerable period of over a
year.294
The fact that the executive may still achieve some of its
policy objectives despite the ultimate rejection by the legislature
means that legislation by press release remains a potent tool for the
executive. This tool is of limited use when revenue is the objective
because the government will not be able to collect the revenue until
the legislation is passed. However, when the objective is to alter the
behaviors and actions of private entities, those behaviors and actions
will be affected from the date of announcement. Of course,
repeated failures to secure the legislature’s “ratification” of the
legislation by press release will introduce uncertainty among private
entities. This situation will dilute the impact, but is unlikely to
negate the influence, of the executive announcement on private
entities.
In particular, given that the legal advice in the
circumstance of uncertain legislation by press release will be a
conservative one that makes provision for the proposed laws,295 the
announcement’s impact will be substantial for substantial economic
activities that typically involve lawyers. Thus, unless it is
abundantly clear that the executive has become a lame duck for
political or legal reasons, the executive will have the incentive to
rely on legislation by press release to out-maneuver an
obstructionist LegCo, notwithstanding the aggravated concerns over
uncertainty and separation of powers.
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See Carbonara et al., supra note 253, at 293-5 (analyzing how the social reaction trigged
by the announcement of pending legal changes can affect the final receptivity of the law);
Joonmo Cho & Iljoong Kim, An Economic Analysis of Takings in Korea: Endogenous
Probability and Announcement Effects, 22 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 331, 343-44 (2002)
(utilizing the case study of a government eminent domain exercise in Korea to discuss how
the government may utilize the resulting drop in property value caused by an
announcement of proposed exercise of eminent domain to achieve its policy and political
objectives even if the proposed exercise is ultimately cancelled).
295
See supra Part III.D. This is also why lawyers have been insisting that the purchaser
deposit the BSD right at the transaction even though the BSD is only due thirty days after
the legislation have passed. There will be an interesting nuances based on whether the
legislation in question is a benefit or a burden. If it is a benefit (e.g., a subsidy for certain
activities), there is less concern about “defensive” lawyering that would otherwise give de
facto effect to a law imposing a burden (e.g., tax) notwithstanding uncertainty as to
eventual passage. However, there would more political pressure on the legislature to give
effect to a benefit, resulting in a corresponding increase, in the likelihood of legislative
passage.
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VI. THE INCONSISTENT HARM OF RETROSPECTIVITY
Beyond the practice of legislation by press release, this case
study also provides a useful reexamination of the conventional
understanding of retrospective laws. Echoing the existing literature
on legislation by press release, the retrospective effect of the
legislative amendment implementing the BSD did not upset the
reliance interests of private individuals. The legislative amendment
was backdated to the public announcement by the government that
included a relatively detailed exposition of the mechanics of the
BSD and received extensive press coverage.296 Potential property
purchasers and sellers would also have been amply advised by their
property agents and lawyers on the pending BSD. In this regard, it
is especially noteworthy that, with the implementation date of the
BSD being the day after the policy announcement, the BSD was
essentially prospectively implemented vis-à-vis the public
announcement. If the objections to retrospective laws are primarily
based on private individuals being blindsided by the subsequent
alterations of the legal consequences of their past actions, then they
are clearly not applicable to the otherwise retrospective BSD.
Nevertheless, many academics have correctly noted that
formally prospective laws can nevertheless upset the reliance
interests of private individuals.297 When the activity implicated by a
prospective law involves a long time horizon or substantial prior
preparatory work, planning by private individuals can still be
detrimentally affected by prospective changes of laws taking effect
during the continuous duration of the activity or after substantial
preparatory work has been undertaken.298 In this regard, given the
lengthy duration involved in the search and purchase of a real
estate—a non-trivial transaction for most private entities—there
would still be major disruptions to private actions even if the initial
announcement of the BSD were actually accompanied by effective
prospective legislation. Private individuals who had commenced
296

See supra Part III.B.
E.g., SAMPFORD, supra note 2, at 24-5 (providing examples of facially prospective laws
with retrospective effect); Palmer & Sampford, supra note 3, at 221-2 (discussing how
prospective legislation can change future consequences of past events); Prebble et al.,
supra note 3, at 25-8 (illustrating situations where a change in law affects pre-existing
rights and expectations). See also Salembier, supra note 3, at 116-8 (arguing for the
separate conceptual category of vested rights to deal with such situations).
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SAMPFORD, supra note 2, at 24-5; Palmer & Sampford, supra note 3, at 221-2.
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the process of finding a suitable property for purchase or who were
already in the process of negotiating the property price might have
had to restart the entire process on account of the hefty new taxes
thwarting their original financial planning.
This insight about the irrelevance of whether the law is
formally retrospective has been well established in the U.S. legal
literature on “legal transition,” a discourse that incorporates
economic perspectives to examine the broader issue of how changes
in legal rules affect the behavior of private entities. Since the major
pioneering works of Michael J. Graetz299 and Louis Kaplow,300 the
concept has enjoyed such wide acceptance and application that a
U.S. commenter observed, “[m]odern scholarship generally supports
the indulgence toward statutory retroactivity, arguing that all
changes in legal rules, whether nominally retrospective or
prospective, defeat expectations based on the prior state of the
law.”301 However, such discourse remains conspicuously absent in
many other jurisdictions where formal retrospectivity is still capable
of inciting public and political agitation and invites special judicial
scrutiny not available to formally prospective laws that may
otherwise have severe retrospective consequences.302 Indeed, the
strong objection of a Hong Kong LegCo member (Margaret Ng) to
the prior 2010 legislation by press release implementing the SSD303
is instructive on misguided criticism based on retrospectivity. The
retrospectivity of the amendments is the central theme of her
criticism, but many of the harms she identifies are neither related to
retrospectivity (e.g., unfairness arising from the substance of the
SSD), 304 nor applicable in light of the notice given by the
299

See Graetz, supra note 28 (discussing the impact of the effective dates of changes in
income tax laws).
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See Kaplow, supra note 28 (evaluating various legal transition policies using economic
analysis).
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Woolhandler, supra note 64, at 1016, 1022-3. For examples of the application of legal
transitions, see, e.g., SHAVIRO, supra note 64 (presenting a transition policy framework for
making normative judgments); Jonathan S. Masur & Jonathan Remy Nash, The
Institutional Dynamics of Transition Relief, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 391, 394-5 (2010)
(addressing why there is no insurance market for legal transitions and identifying the best
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See supra Part II.A & II.B.
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Official Record of Proceedings, Legislative Council, 12365, 12561-64 (June 22, 2011)
(H.K.).
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The highlighted problems relating to the uncertainty surrounding the definition of
“acquired” and “disposed of” or unfairness due to the lack of exemption for transactions
between close relatives remained in the final version of the bill that was ultimately passed,
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government (e.g., the guidance of the law).305 This is not to say that
the SSD is above criticism but simply that retrospectivity is not at
issue despite its attractiveness as a rhetorical tool.
In this regard, Charles Sampford appropriately critiques the
blanket aversion towards retrospective laws while advocating for a
contextual analysis that focuses on the affected expectations of the
private individuals.306 Indeed, if protection of expectations is the
rationale, then Sampford and others are correct to highlight that the
key issue is whether the expectation is indeed rational and
legitimate, 307 with the implication that retrospective laws that
counteract irrational or illegitimate expectations (e.g., laws targeting
tax evasion by exploiting unintended legislative loopholes)308 or that
seek to protect rational and legitimate expectations (e.g., curative
legislation to restore previous widespread, reasonable understanding
that is subsequently judicially adjudicated to be wrong), are
consistent and justified under the reliance reasoning.309
Moreover, the analysis of retrospective laws must be
sensitive toward the underlying political infrastructure of the
jurisdiction. The concerns about retrospectivity, in particular, and
legal transition, in general, are premised on both the existence and
the desirability of a stable legal regime.310 This situation might
arguably be true for stable democracies that have not witnessed any
major changes to their governing institutions for a considerable
and would not be remedied by the removal of retrospectivity. Cf. Official Record of
Proceedings, Legislative Council, 12365, 12562-63; (June 22, 2011) (H.K.); Stamp Duty
Ordinance, (2013) Cap. 117, § 29CA (H.K.).
305
Official Record of Proceedings, Legislative Council, 12365, 12561-2 (June 22, 2011)
(H.K.).
306
SAMPFORD, supra note 2, at 247-56. See also GOLDING, supra note 5, at 247-22
(discussing the criteria of whether reasonable expectations are unfairly frustrated that was
advanced by Lon L. Fuller).
307
SAMPFORD, supra note 2, at 88-95; Fisch, supra note 3, at 1085-6. See Påhlsson, supra
note 8, at 273 (noting EU jurisprudence that seeks to protect legitimate expectations). See
also GOLDING, supra note 5, at 246-7 (observing how the passage of time may affect the
analysis–where individuals may have reasonable expectations about the continuation of
laws that are otherwise promulgated by a dubious regime and morally suspect if that
dubious regime enjoys considerable longevity).
308
SAMPFORD, supra note 2, at 147-51 (discussing Australian retrospective laws against
blatant tax evasion).
309
Id., at 104-18 (discussing the various sub-categories of curative legislation).
310
C.f. Fisch, supra note 3, at 1105-8 (observing how the conventional fairness arguments–
as opposed to the efficiency arguments that favors retrospectivity–are most applicable in
the situation where the law/regulation is in a stable equilibrium).
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period, such as the U.K. and the U.S. However, this state of affairs
is certainly not common around the globe, where ongoing political
and democratic transitions remain the current norm. In Hong Kong,
for example, vigorous public debate and political maneuvering have
been ongoing with respect to constitutional reforms to transition the
current “partial democracy” 311 into one in which the Chief
Executive and LegCo are truly democratically elected by universal
suffrage.312
Where a jurisdiction is undergoing substantial changes in the
very foundation of its constitutional structure, both of the premises
that underpin the objections towards retrospectivity are absent. The
existence of a stable legal regime is by definition absent during
institutional transition.
The desirability of stability is also
questionable in a context where the shortcomings of the prior
regime typically serve as the impetus for change. Martin P. Golding
argued that retrospective legislation may be “the best way of dealing
with a messy situation” arising from the transition of a despotic
regime to a democratic government given the need to express moral
judgment of the past. 313 Indeed, even in the context of stable
democracies, there may be selected areas where legal changes are
frequent at certain times such that retrospectivity is desirable314 or
where retrospective laws are necessary to remedy the underlying
regime suffering from systemic deficiencies in need of change.315
Thus, this case study of legislation by press release reaffirms
the fallacy of adopting a special approach when dealing with formal
retrospectivity. A proper appreciation of the rationales against
retrospectivity reveals that the importance of protecting the reliance
interests of private individuals is neither universal among, nor
unique to, formally retrospective laws. It is more fruitful to be
sensitive to the expectations that will be altered under any laws and
to appreciate that there will be many instances in which the
alteration of such expectations, whether by retrospective or
311
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prospective laws, will be normatively justified.
These
considerations are especially important for regimes undergoing
transition, where there is likely to be a greater scope of
circumstances in which retrospective laws are normatively justified.

VII. CONCLUSION
The implementation of the BSD provides an illustrative case
study to critically reexamine legislation by press release in
particular and retrospective laws in general. The prospective
announcement of pending retrospective changes to law not only
enhances the legality of legislation by press but also defuses the
objections to retrospective laws that are premised on protecting the
reliance interests of private individuals. Notwithstanding qualms
about the increased use of this mechanism to effect speedy legal
changes, legislation by press release may be normatively justified—
but only after circumspect examination of whether the use is really
necessary to prevent circumvention of policy objectives and
whether the underlying political dynamic will aggravate the harm of
uncertainty and the executive’s usurpation of legislative powers.
On a broader note, legislation by press release confirms that the
conventional aversion towards retrospective laws can misleadingly
distract from the crux issue of legal transition in both retrospective
and prospective laws.
The awareness of these issues is critical. Given the general
legality of both legislation by press release and retrospective law
under the current laws of most jurisdictions, a well-informed public
discourse and political process are ultimately the best check to
ensure that the usage of the practice is confined to situations in
which it is truly warranted. After all, the use of legislation by press
release—to effect potentially far-reaching economic regulation no
less—is not going away anytime soon.

